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Summary 
This thesis explores how crimes against humanity in general and the crime 
of forcible transfer of population in particular, cover the most serious 
situations of development-induced displacement. The focus lies on the legal 
protection through international criminal law of persons displaced in an 
unjustified way as a result of development projects, such as the building of 
dams, roads, and other infrastructure, as well as the exploitation of natural 
resources in mining and oil projects, to name just a few examples. 
 
Although efforts have been made to define crimes against humanity, there 
is, to date, no universally recognised definition of the crime in customary 
international law. Hence, the critical lack of consistency in approaching 
development-induced displacement mirrors a broader jurisprudential debate 
in the international courts and tribunals regarding the crime of forcible 
transfer of population. At the heart of the debate is the conceptual problem 
of identifying the contours of the crime of forcible displacement.  
 
However, analysing the relationship between development-induced 
displacement and crimes against humanity reveals an evolving state of 
affairs. Although, there is a conspicuous lack of state practice, there is 
increasingly international recognition that development-induced 
displacement has many of the same effects upon the displaced as other 
groups who have been forcibly displaced, such as people who are forced to 
flee from conflicts or human rights violations.  
 
In this thesis this is exemplified by analysing the circumstances surrounding 
development-induced displacement during the implementation of the 
Mombasa-Mariakani Road Dualling Project in Kenya. Applying the 
elements of the crime against humanity to the facts of this case, the forced 
evictions in Jomvu arguably satisfy the elements of the crime of forcible 
transfer of population. It is concluded herein that there exist circumstances 
under which development-induced displacement can equate to other forms 
of forcible transfer of population. In these situations responsible actors can 
not rely on an overriding public interests to avoid criminal responsibility.  
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Sammanfattning 
Denna uppsats utforskar hur brott mot mänskligheten kan omfatta de 
allvarligaste situationerna av utvecklingsorsakad tvångsförflyttning (eng. 
development-induced displacement), till exempel då lokalbefolkning 
tvångsförflyttas i samband med genomförande av ett utvecklingsprojekt, 
såsom vid konstruktion av dammar, vägar och annan infrastruktur samt 
utvinnande av naturresurser i gruvdrift och oljeutvinning, för att nämna 
några exempel. 
 
Trots att det har gjorts ansträngningar att definiera ‘brott mot 
mänskligheten’, saknas det en erkänd definition av brottet i internationell 
sedvanerätt. Uppsatsens utgångspunkt är dock att tvångsförflyttning av 
människor mot deras vilja kan utgöra ett brott mot mänskligheten. 
Forskningsfrågan är därför inte om, utan under vilka omständigheter 
utvecklingsorsakad tvångsförflyttning kan utgöra ett brott mot 
mänskligheten.  
 
Utvecklingsprojekt är, i stort sett, universellt erkända som positiva och 
önskvärda. Detta har lett till att utvecklingsorsakad tvångsförflyttning, till 
skillnad från andra handlingar som orsakar tvångsförflyttningar, har ansetts 
försvarbart.  Fördelarna för den stora massan har bedömts väga upp de 
kränkningar av mänskliga rättigheter som den drabbade lokalbefolkningen 
får utstå.  
 
Dock visar slutsatserna i denna uppsats på att det existerar omständigheter 
under vilka utvecklingsorsakad tvångsförflyttning bör likställas med andra 
former av tvångsförflyttning. I dessa situationer kan argument som stort 
allmänintresse inte fria de ansvariga personerna från straffrättsligt ansvar för 
brott mot mänskligheten. 
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Preface 
I visited Kenya for the first time in October 2016. Spending a few weeks in 
the country I decided to do some exploring outside Nairobi’s vibrant streets. 
One excursion went to Mombasa to enjoy some lazy days on the beach. To 
get there from Nairobi I had to travel the A109-highway. The road is no 
longer than 500 kilometres; however the journey takes approximately nine 
hours. Indeed, it was a long journey and I was relieved to finally arrived in 
Mombasa.  
 
Along the way we passed countless settlements with vibrant market places 
and people carrying out their daily business. One such place was Jomvu, an 
informal settlement just outside Mombasa, where we stopped for 
refreshments. In Jomvu I was for the first time introduced to the human 
rights issues surrounding the Mombasa-Mariakani Road Dualling Project. 
Today, six month later, I am proud to dedicate this thesis to the population 
of Jomvu, whom on the night of the 17 May 2015 saw their homes erased 
by a bulldozer paving the way for development. 
 
********** 
 
I would like to take this opportunity to thank my supervisor Britta Sjöstedt, 
her support and flexibility has been invaluable.  
 
Since this thesis symbolise the end of an era, I would also like to give a 
shout out to all the amazing and inspiring people I have met during my 
(many) years in university.  
 
Last but not least, my dear family, thank you for unlimited love and support. 
There really is no place like home!  
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Abbreviations 
CESCR  United Nation’s Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights 
HRC  United Nation’s Human Rights Committee 
ICC  International Criminal Court 
ICCPR  International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights 
ICTR   International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
ICTY   International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia 
ILC  International Law Commission 
KENHA  Kenya National Highways Authority 
Nuremberg Charter Charter of the International Military Tribunal 
OTP  International Criminal Court Office of the 
Prosecutor  
RAP  Resettlement Action Plan 
Rome Statute Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
Tokyo Charter Charter of the International Military Tribunal for 
the Far East 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Purpose 
This thesis explores how crimes against humanity in general and the crime 
of forcible transfer of population in particular, covers the most serious 
situations of development-induced displacement. I intend to make a case 
arguing that the most heinous acts of development-induced displacement are 
inherently crimes against humanity. Thus, responsible actors may already 
today be held criminally responsible in a court under universal jurisdiction.1 
Over thirty years ago, the United Nations General Assembly 
adopted a declaration on the right of development.2 It stated that: 
[D]evelopment is a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political 
process, which aims at the constant improvement of the well-being of the 
entire population and of all individuals on the basis of their active, free and 
meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of 
benefits resulting therefrom.3  
Indeed, development has the potential to strengthen the local economy and 
labour market, improve local infrastructure and promote tourism.4 However, 
it is not all beneficial, there is increasing evidence to suggest that due to 
large-scale development projects, such as dams, roads and exploitation of 
raw materials, the lives of ordinary people may be seriously affected. 
Exploitation of labour and forced evictions of local residents are examples 
of common consequences.5 Additionally, affected areas may be faced with 
financial debts and the local environment may be severely and permanently 
damaged. In other words, while the right to development aims to contribute 
to a world that respects human dignity, large-scale development projects 
may constitute a threat to people’s fundamental human rights.  
The term development-induced displacement, although no 
international standing, draws attention to the increasing significance of 
protection from human rights violations for those affected by development 
                                                
1 Universal jurisdiction is based on the notion that some crimes, i.e. crimes against 
humanity, are of such exceptional gravity that they affect the fundamental interests of the 
international community as a whole. Accordingly, the only condition for exercising 
universal jurisdiction is the nature of the crime. 
2 UN General Assembly, Declaration on the Right to Development: resolution / adopted by 
the General Assembly, 4 December 1986, A/RES/41/128. 
3 Declaration on the Right to Development, preamble. 
4 Declaration on the Right to Development, preamble. 
5 Michael M. Cernea, Development-induced and Conflict-induced IDPs: Bridging the 
Research Divide, Forced Migration Review, Special Issue, at 25-27 (December 2006). 
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projects. The most straightforward definition of development-induced 
displacement is that, for the purpose of development, communities and 
individuals are forced out of their homes and their homelands. The 
consequences for victims may be comparably as dire as those that confront 
people who are forced to flee from conflicts or natural disasters.6 However, 
the development-induced displaced persons are disproportionally 
disadvantaged when it comes to international attention, aid, sympathy and 
academic research. 
In the context of the right to development, the negative side 
effects raise the question as to whether or not they are an unavoidable price 
for development. As this thesis will show, international human rights law 
sets up certain conditions, which must be fulfilled for a displacement to be 
considered lawful and justified. In other words, rather than speaking of 
unfortunate but necessary sacrifices for a good cause, a distinction must be 
made between displacement in accordance with international human rights 
law and standards, e.g. carried out after public hearings have been held, 
compensation has been agreed upon and legal remedies have been made 
available to the affected individuals, and displacement in violation of these 
standards.  
By presenting the most heinous acts of development-induced 
displacement as a crime against humanity, to which responsible actors may 
be held criminally responsible under universal jurisdiction, I hope to 
contribute to raising international attention to these atrocious acts. I believe 
that if these kinds of acts were to be prosecuted as crimes against humanity, 
not only would it offer the victims redress and recognition, but it would also 
force actors involved in large-scale development projects to begin to 
recognise and fulfil their responsibilities.  
 
1.2 Research question 
In this thesis, development-induced displacement will be examined in 
relation to the crime of forcible transfer of population. Indeed, the crime 
against humanity belongs to an area of international law where doubts of its 
scope still remain. This thesis’ agreed starting premise is however that 
forcibly moving individuals from their homes is a crime against humanity. 
The focus lies on the legal protection through international criminal law of 
persons displaced in an unjustified way as a result of development projects 
                                                
6 Dawson, Grant & Farber, Sonia, Forcible Displacement Throughout the Ages: Towards 
an International Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Forcible 
Displacement (International Humanitarian Law Series) Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012, 
p. 129. 
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and processes. Thus, this thesis is concerned with when development-
induced displacement can constitute crimes against humanity. The following 
question will be answered in regard to customary international law: 
 
Under which circumstances does development-induced displacement 
constitute a crime against humanity through forcible transfer of populations? 
 
To satisfactorily answer this question, these subsequent questions will be 
addressed: 
 
o What is development-induced displacement? 
 
o What international human rights standards must be fulfilled for 
development-induced displacement to be justified? 
 
o What elements are required for an act to constitute a crime against 
humanity? 
 
1.3 Delimitations 
I have chosen to make four delimitations. Firstly, this thesis is concerned 
with international customary law. Thus, it does not attend to questions of the 
limitations imposed by the narrow jurisdiction of the international tribunals 
in general, and the International Criminal Court (ICC) in particular. Rather, 
the aim is to clarify when development-induced displacement is a crime 
against humanity, thereby allowing national authorities of any state to 
investigate and prosecute people for the crime under universal jurisdiction.  
 Secondly, it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss and 
analyse the existence, recognition and content of the human right to 
development. The right to development, however, comes into play in the 
balancing exercise between the individual’s interest not to be displaced and 
the public interest of development. 
Thirdly, this thesis is only concerned with the anthropologic 
and sociological consequences for victims of development-induced 
displacement to the extent that it can improve the understanding of legal 
assessment under international criminal law. It is outside the scope of this 
paper to provide an in depth analysis of the concept itself.  
Finally, my intention is not to provide an exhaustive analysis 
of the human rights regime in relation to development-induced 
displacement. Rather, I have chosen to delimit the number of rights 
addressed in this thesis to those most obviously violated in regard to 
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displacement. This does not mean however that other rights, such as the 
right to freedom from inhuman or degrading treatment or the right not to be 
discriminated against, can not be violated as a result of development-
induced displacement. 
1.4 Methodology  
For the purpose of this thesis I have relied largely on the legal dogmatic 
methodology. Although an exposition of this kind may contain other 
considerations, the core of legal dogmatic consists of the interpretation and 
systematisation of valid law. This thesis endeavours to contribute to a 
progressive view of international law. It seeks to move the law forward and 
interpret it in light of modern norms. 
I have extensively used primary legal sources to examinee the 
standards agreed upon by the community of states, which to some extent 
reflects customary international law. In interpreting the primary legal 
sources, the customary rules of interpretation reflected in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties7, have been guiding the conformation. 
Namely, that a treaty shall be interpreted in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning and in the light of the treaty’s object and purpose.8  
 To answer my research question I have, firstly, examined the 
relevant customary rules, and secondly, offered supportive arguments to 
justify the proposed solutions. My intention is not only to describe the 
substance in the relevant law, but also to propose solutions for a case to 
which, at least apparently, the law does not provide a single right answer. 
Thus, in my analysis I have chosen to apply and analyse the findings from 
examining the law to a real case of development-induced displacement.  
Relying on legal justification, the principle of nullum crimen 
sine lege, often referred to as the principle of legality, must be taken into 
consideration. While it may seem relatively straight forward, the principle 
can be difficult to apply to customary international law. In the words of one 
commentator, the principle ‘which relies on expressed prohibitions and is 
based explicitly on the value of legal certainty, sits uneasily with the very 
nature of customary international law, which is unwritten and frequently 
                                                
7 United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969; see also 
Judgment in the Prosecutor’s Application for Extraordinary Review of Pre-Trial Chamber 
I’s 31 March 2006 Decision denying Leave to Appeal, ICC Appeals Chamber, 13 July 
2006, Case No. ICC-01/04-168, para 21, stating; ‘the interpretation of treaties, and the 
Rome Statute is no exception, is governed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(23 May 1969), specifically the provisions of articles 31 and 32.’ 
8 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, article 31, the general rule on interpretation. 
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difficult to define with precision’.9 Consequently, the principle imposes 
certain limitations; new law can not be created from interpreting existing 
law beyond the reasonable limits of acceptable clarification. 
However, in relation to vague and open-ended definitions of 
offences in customary international criminal law, the principle does not 
prevent interpreting and clarifying the elements of a particular crime.10 
Furthermore, the principle does not preclude ‘the progressive development 
of the law’.11 Including development-induced displacement in the scope of 
the crime of forcible transfer of population is, as will be analysed in depth in 
this thesis, not a case of creating a new international crime, but an attempt to 
clarify the scope of the crime in an unexplored setting. 
 
1.5 Material 
In the process of identifying customary international law in regard to 
international criminal law, the importance of the Statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the Statute of the 
ICC, as well as jurisprudence from these courts, cannot be emphasised 
enough.  
Complementary to the primary legal sources, this thesis relies 
on secondary legal sources. Two documents of the International Law 
Committee (ILC) have been of increasing importance; the Draft Code of 
Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind12 from 1996 and the 
First Report on Crimes Against Humanity13 from 2015. The former creating 
an overview on what was considered customary international law in relation 
to crimes against humanity twenty years ago, and the latter what is 
considered customary international law today. 
                                                
9 Lamb, Susan B., Nulla Poena Sine Lege in International Criminal law, in Antonio 
Cassasa, Paola Gaeta and John RWD (eds), The Rome Statue of International Criminal 
Court: A Commentary, vol, 1, Oxford University Press (2002), page 743. 
10 Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, ICTY, Appeal Judgement 24 March 2000, Case no IT-
95-14/1-A, para 127; Procecutor v. Zejnil Delalic at al, ICTY, Appeal Judgement 20 
February 2001, Case no IT-96-21-A, para 173. 
11 Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljevic, ICTY, Trial Chamber II, 29 November 2002, Case no IT-
98-32-T, para 196. 
12 United Nations International Law Committee, Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace 
and Security of Mankind, 1996. 
13 Murphy, Sean D., First Report of the Special Rapporteur on Crimes Against Humanity 
(February 17, 2015). The report is a result of ILC’s decision, at its sixty-sixth session in 
2014, to move the topic of crimes against humanity onto its current programme of work and 
to appoint a Special Rapporteur. In 2014, the General Assembly also took note of this 
development. 
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Within the context of international human rights law, the most 
significant documents touched upon are the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR). The documents are relied upon to 
create a general image over the extent to which victims of development-
induced displacements rights are violated. There are undoubtedly several 
other important sources of international human rights law. However, the 
purpose of this paper is not to provide an exhaustive analysis of rights 
violated in relation to development-induced displacement, but rather to 
investigate when the perpetrator can be held criminally accountable. Thus, I 
have chosen to delimit the legal sources of international human rights law 
mainly to the international bill of human rights. 
For the analysis of an existing case of development-induced 
displacement I have chosen the Mombasa-Mariakani Road Dualling Project 
in Kenya. The facts analysed are based, unless otherwise indicated, on a 
report made by Amnesty International in 2015, named ‘Driven Out for 
Development: Forced Evictions in Mombasa’14. The report focuses on the 
human rights implications of the road dualling project on people living in 
the affected areas. It is based on research conducted by Amnesty 
International in Mombasa in 2015.15 Researchers visited two informal 
settlements and interviewed people affected by the project. They also met 
with representatives of several different government ministries and 
departments involved in the project. In addition, to provide a balanced 
overall perspective of the project, I have reviewed a range of project 
documents, including the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment and 
Resettlement Action Plan. On the assumption that the factual findings of the 
Amnesty report are accurate, the conclusions reached therein are adopted for 
the purpose of the case analysis.  
 
1.6 Previous research 
While the crime against humanity has been researched extensively, the 
definition under customary international law remains open-ended. As 
emphasised above, one of the most important actors within the field of 
promoting the progressive development of international law and its 
codification is the ILC. In 2014 the Commission decided to move crimes 
against humanity onto its current programme of work and to appoint a 
                                                
14 Amnesty International, Driven out for Development: Forced evictions in Mombasa, 
Kenya, (2015), available at: https://www.amnesty.be/IMG/pdf/afr3224672015english.pdf 
[accessed 21 May 2017]. 
15 Ibid., page 8. 
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Special Rapporteur. Appointed for the position of Special Rapporteur was 
Sean D. Murphy.16  
 In 2015, Murphy published his first report on crimes against 
humanity. The report provides a general background with respect to the 
emergence of the concept of crimes against humanity, its application by 
international courts and tribunals and its incorporation in the national laws 
of some states. Ultimately, the report proposes two draft articles, one on 
prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity and the other on the 
definition of such crimes. Murphy’s work on the definition of the crime 
against humanity has been invaluable for this thesis.  
 The literature on development-induced displacement reflects a 
broader sense that the international community has not yet directly 
addressed the problem of development-induced displacement, let alone 
fashioned a solution. While it has been increasingly researched among 
sociologists and anthropologists during the last thirty years, only recently 
has it received attention from legal scholars. In relation to international 
criminal law in general and crimes against humanity in particular, however, 
the academic attention remains anything but lively. With this thesis I aim to 
start filling that gap and contribute to getting the victims of development-
induced displacement out from the shadows. 
 
1.7 Outline 
This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter one is the introduction, 
chapter two is introducing the reader to the development-induced 
displacement and the applicable human rights framework, chapter three is 
trying to bridge development-induced displacement to crimes against 
humanity and chapter four is giving an overview of the elements required 
for an act to constitute a crime against humanity. Finally, chapter five is 
providing an in-depth analysis of a real situation where the elements of the 
crime against humanity may be satisfied and chapter six provides a 
conclusion and the authors final remarks.  
 Chapter 1 introduces the reader to the research question of this 
thesis and its delimitations. Furthermore, the methodology and material on 
which this thesis relies on is presented together with a short overview of 
previous research made within the field of development-induced 
displacement. 
                                                
16 Sean D. Murphy is the Patricia Roberts Harris Research Professor of Law at the George 
Washington University Law School in Washington, D.C. His primary area of scholarly 
research are public international law, foreign affairs and the U.S. Constitution, international 
organizations, international dispute settlement, and law of the sea. 
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Chapter 2 attempts to define the term development-induced 
displacement. It highlights the underlying values that shape our approach to 
development and to development-induced displacement. The chapter also 
addresses the human rights safeguards applicable to development-induced 
displacement, in particular, the right to adequate housing. In addition, 
several guidelines on development-induced displacement, which read out 
the circumstances under which displacement may be carried out in a lawful 
way, are touched upon.  
Chapter 3 attempts to bridge the alleged crime of 
development-induced displacement to the international criminal framework 
of the crime against humanity in general and the crime of forcible transfer of 
population in particular. The first section of the chapter is concerned with 
the development of the crime against humanity through the last decades; it 
attempts to explain how the crime has evolved and why development-related 
crimes have not been a point of focus in the otherwise rapid expansion of 
the crime. The second section focuses on debated questions relating to the 
definition of crime against humanity through forcible transfer of population. 
Finally, the third section presents a growing coherent basis affirmatively 
establishing development-induced displacement as a crime against humanity 
through forcible transfer of population. 
Chapter 4 is the main substantive chapter, as it examinees the 
prerequisites required for an act to constitute a crime against humanity in 
accordance with customary international law. Firstly examining the 
prohibited act and secondly, the contextual elements of the crime. This 
chapter presents the facts that are further analysed and discussed in the two 
final chapters. 
Chapter 5 consists of this thesis’ main analysis. The findings 
in chapter 4 are applied to the Mombasa-Mariakani Road Dualling Project 
in Kenya. The following questions are addressed: (1) was there, in fact, a 
‘deportation or forcible transfer of population’, through ‘expulsion or other 
coercive acts’; (2) were the persons subject to such transfer ‘lawfully 
present’ in the area from which they were removed; (3) did the acts in 
question constitute a ‘widespread or systematic attack directed against any 
civilian population’; and (4) are there grounds under international law under 
which the forcible transfer could take place. 
Chapter 6 provides a conclusion and the authors final remarks. 
It is concluded herein that there exist circumstances under which 
development-induced displacement can equate to other forms of forcible 
transfer of population. In these situations responsible actors can not rely on 
an overriding public interests to avoid criminal responsibility. 
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2 The Alleged Crime 
Development-induced displacement consists of the forcible movement of 
persons from their homes due to development projects, such as the building 
of dams, roads, and other infrastructure, as well as the exploitation of 
natural resources in mining and oil projects, to name just a few examples. 
In comparison to other forms of forced displacement, development-induced 
displacement differs in one significant way. Whereas persecution, conflict or 
natural disasters are never considered to be a ‘just cause’ in and of 
themselves, development is by many considered to be valid justification for 
displacement. 
This chapter attempts to define the term development-induced 
displacement. It highlights the underlying values that shape our approach to 
development and to development-induced displacement. Furthermore, it 
addresses the human rights safeguards applicable to development-induced 
displacement, in particular, the right to adequate housing offer significant 
legal protection and, moreover, can be said to imply a right not to be 
arbitrarily displaced. In addition, several guidelines on development-
induced displacement, which read out the circumstances under which 
displacement may be carried out in a lawful way, are touched upon.  
 
2.1 Development and its costs 
Development comprises all kinds of major projects to develop 
infrastructure, harness energy, and extract land resources. The most 
common projects involve the construction of dams, building or expansion of 
transport routes, and large-scale extraction of natural resources such as 
minerals and oil. 17 These are projects that are useful for a number of 
reasons, e.g. dams are necessary for generation of hydroelectric power, 
which offers a clean, sustainable alternative to fossil fuel power generation 
at a time when climate change has become one of humanity’s greatest 
threats.18 
 It is obvious that large development projects such as dams, 
roads, and exploitation of raw materials require landmass, which in turn 
necessitates displacement of local residents. In addition to physically 
displacing persons, development projects interfere with the livelihoods of 
many who do not inhabit land appropriated for development projects, but 
who depend upon it for activities such as farming, fishing, and collecting 
                                                
17 Dawson, Grant & Farber, Sonia (2012), page 30. 
18 Ibid., page 31. 
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raw materials.19 Thus, the displacement can be direct, such as when a 
government orders individuals to abandon their land to provide space for the 
development project, or it can be indirect, usually occurring when the 
development project has secondary effects, such as large areas being 
flooded due to the installation of dams, rendering the surrounding area 
uninhabitable. 
Usually the most vulnerable and marginalised population 
groups, such as indigenous people, are disproportionally affected. Apart 
from threatening life, resources, livelihoods and the natural environment, 
large development projects may also threaten culture and cultural identity of 
the victims.20 When it comes to indigenous communities, displacement does 
not only dislocate them from their natural environment, it also forces them 
to abandon their traditional lifestyle.21 Thus, displacement breaks up living 
patterns and social continuity, but it may also become a tool for ethnic 
dislocation and disempowerment in disguise. 
Regardless of the type of project that causes displacement, 
people who are forced from their homes due to development can be affected 
in similar ways, suffering a range of emotional, physical, and socio-
economic harm. Sociologist Michael Cernea22 has identified eight 
interlinked potential risks of displacement. These are landlessness, 
homelessness, loss of livelihood, marginalization, food insecurity, increased 
morbidity, loss of access to common property resources, and community 
disarticulation or social disintegration.23 When people are forced to leave 
their homelands in order to find affordable housing after being evicted or 
displaced, they risk becoming dislocated from their existing community and 
social networks. In the worst cases, this may involve breaking up families. 
Access to work and education opportunities may also become more 
restricted.24 
                                                
19 Michael M. Cernea, Understanding and Preventing Impoverishment from Displacement: 
Reflections on the State of Knowledge, Refugee Studies 245, (1995), page 251. 
20 United Nation General Assembly, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples: resolution/adopted by the General Assembly, 2 October 
2007, A/RES/61/295, annex. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Michael M. Cernea is Research Professor of Anthropology and International Relations at 
George Washington University. He has carried out social research, policy work, and 
development project work in many countries throughout Africa, Asia, the Middle East, 
Europe and Latin America. Cernea has written and edited numerous books and studies on 
development, social change, population resettlement, social forestry, grassroots 
organizations, and participation. 
23 M. Cernea, Impoverishment Risks, Risk management, and Reconstruction; A Model of 
Population Displacement and Resettlement. Paper presented to the UN Symposium on 
Hydropower and Sustainable Development, Beijing, 27-29 October 2004, page 14-26. 
24 Ibid., page 14. 
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2.2 Affected regions 
Even though development-induced displacement prevails especially in the 
global south, in countries that are engaged in large-scale projects to increase 
and improve their economies and domestic infrastructures, it is a worldwide 
phenomenon. Estimates of global numbers of people who may be affected 
vary widely. However, approximately fifteen million individuals are 
affected every year.25  
 Because development projects are dependent upon significant 
monetary funds, they are most common in countries that possess the 
resources to pay for such projects or in countries that are seen to be stable 
enough, both financially and politically, to be attractive to foreign investors 
and to international lending institutions, such as the World Bank.26 While 
this description fits many countries, perhaps the most obvious are the Asian 
countries, which account for the greatest amount of development-induced 
displacement in the world. One example, among many, that have led to 
large-scale displacement is the construction of the enormous Three Gorges 
Dam in China, a hydroelectric dam in Hubei province, which was completed 
in 2006. The dam resulted in the displacement of more than one million 
people.27  
The occurrence of development-induced displacement is 
however increasingly an issue in African and Latin American countries. 
Common factors in the countries where the displacement is extensive is that 
they either do not have, or are only just now in the progress of developing, 
domestic policies to govern development-induced displacement.28 Or they 
have relatively comprehensive development policies, however, struggle with 
the implementation of these policies.29 Thus, the legal framework for 
addressing the needs of the displaced is non-existent or 
undeveloped. Another not uncommon factor is that the development plans 
and resettlement plans largely underestimate the numbers of the displaced, 
particularly given the complexities in determining which individuals will be 
negatively affected by development projects in ways other than physical 
displacement. 
 
                                                
25 Michael M. Cernea (2006), page 25-27. 
26Dawson, Grant & Farber, Sonia (2012), page 136-141. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
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2.3 Defining development-induced 
displacement 
The simplest definition of development-induced displacement is that it 
means forcing communities and individuals out of their homes and their 
homelands, for the purposes of development.30 Displacement must in this 
context be separated from resettlement. Whereas resettlement can be defined 
as a planned and organised relocation to a strictly specified new place of 
residence, accompanied by social support mechanisms and compensation 
for lost goods; displacement is understood as dislocation from the homeland 
territory without social support in the new place of residence.31 
Development-induced displacement is comparable to 
displacement due to armed conflict or human rights violations.32 Just like 
the latter, people displaced as a result of development projects, are 
compelled to face the challenge of starting a new life in an unfamiliar 
environment. They suffer from loss of homes and livelihoods, scattering of 
communities, and sometimes physical and psychological damage associated 
with involuntary displacement.33  
However, whereas persecution, conflict or natural disasters are 
never considered to be a ‘good cause’ in and of themselves, development, 
including the construction or establishment of dams, ports, mines, railways, 
highways, airports, irrigation canals, urban infrastructure, forestry and 
agriculture projects, for reasons of urban or rural economic development is 
by many considered to be valid justification for displacement.34 
From an ethical point of view, three theoretical perspectives 
have been suggested to justify development-induced displacement.35 First, 
the public interest perspective, which uses a cost-benefit analysis, wherein 
displacement is a cost. Where the benefits of the project exceed the costs, 
the project is considered justified. The second perspective, with self-
determination as a central value, considers displacement immoral except in 
cases where the affected people are offered and accept adequate 
compensation, and subsequently move voluntarily. Finally, the third 
perspective accepts development-induced displacement when the project 
                                                
30 Note that the most well-known definition of internally displaced persons established in 
Guiding Principles of Internal Displacement (1998) omits development projects as a cause 
of displacement. See section 2.4.1. 
31 Terminski, Bogumil, Development-induced displacement and resettlement: causes, 
consequences, and socio-legal context (2015), page 574. 
32 Dawson, Grant & Farber, Sonia (2012), page 129. 
33 Michael M. Cernea (2006), page 25-27. 
34 Terminski, Bogumil (2015), page 49. 
35 Satiroglu, Irge, Development-induced displacement and resettlement (2015), page 142.  
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decreases social inequalities by primarily benefitting the poor and thus 
reducing global poverty.36 Whichever ethical perspective is preferred, it is 
clear that development-induced displacement is characterised by conflicting 
interests and conflicting rights. On the one hand, there is the public interest 
of the people benefitting from the projects. On the other hand, there are the 
human rights of the potential and actual victims of development-induced 
displacement.  
 
2.4 Protection from development-induced 
displacement  
Until recently, development-induced displacement was treated mainly as an 
issue of indigenous rights, focusing on the right to land, the right to culture, 
and the right to self-determination.37 Another approach has been to view it 
as a domestic problem, to which domestic - as opposed to international - 
solutions are needed.38 While these approaches to the protection against 
development-induced displacement are still advocated by some, there has 
been a notable shift towards viewing development-induced displacement as 
an international human rights issue, and thus a matter for which both the 
international community and states are responsible.39 
 There are several human rights that are broadly applicable to 
the rights of those displaced by development. These rights include, among 
others, the right to housing, the right to freedom of movement and 
residence, the rights to private and family life and home and the right to 
property. Additionally, many other human rights can be implicated in 
displacement cases. For example, where people are evicted with violence 
and intimidation, the right to security of the person as well as the right to 
life may be threatened.40 The right to freedom of expression and freedom of 
association may be implicated when community leaders who oppose an 
eviction are arrested. The right to information and participation is also 
frequently interfered with in cases of displacement. People living in constant 
fear of eviction suffer psychologically and physically; therefore, their right 
to health may not be secure. Other human rights potentially implicated in 
cases of displacement are the rights to freedom from torture and other cruel, 
                                                
36 Ibid., page 143. 
37 Dawson, Grant & Farber, Sonia (2012), page 132. 
38 Ibid., page 133. 
39 Ibid., page 132-133. 
40 Terminski, Bogumil (2015), page 473-475. 
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inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,41 and freedom from 
discrimination. The frequent and wide-range of violation indicate that the 
human rights dimensions of displacement are extensive.  
 
2.4.1 The human rights framework 
While civil and political rights, such as the right to life, the right to security 
of the person and the right to non-interference with privacy, family and 
home, enshrined in the ICCPR may offer more effective protection from a 
judicial point of view, the principal legal framework for protecting 
individuals against arbitrary displacement are the socioeconomic rights 
protected by the ICESCR.42  
Article 2(1) of the ICESCR states:  
 Each State Party is under the obligation to take steps […] to the maximum 
of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full 
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all 
appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative 
measures.43 
The principle of progressive realisation, differs from that of the ICCPR, 
which obliges parties to ‘respect and to ensure to all individuals within its 
territory and subject to its jurisdiction’ the rights in the Convention.44 The 
principle of progressive realisation acknowledges that some of the rights in 
the ICESCR may be difficult in practice to achieve in a short period of time 
with limited means. Instead, the requirement to take steps imposes a 
continuing obligation to work towards the realisation of the rights. It also 
rules out deliberately regressive measures, which impede that goal.45  
                                                
41 Hajrizi Dzemajl et al. v. Yugoslavia, CAT/C/29/D/161/2000, UN Committee Against 
Torture (CAT), 2 December 2002. In this case, the Committee held that the burning and 
destruction of houses, which resulted in displacement, constituted, in the circumstances, 
acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (para. 9.2).  
42 See UN Commission on Human Rights, Resolution on the Prohibition of Forced 
Evictions (2004/28), 16 April 2004, para. 1, ‘that the practice of forced eviction that is 
contrary to laws that are in conformity with international human rights standards 
constitutes a gross violation of a broad range of human rights, in particular the right to 
adequate housing’. 
43 ICESCR, article 2(1). 
44 ICCPR, article 2(1). 
45 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment 
No. 3: The Nature of States Parties' Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of the Covenant), 14 
December 1990, E/1991/23, para 9, ‘The concept of progressive realization constitutes a 
recognition of the fact that full realization of all economic, social and cultural rights will 
generally not be able to be achieved in a short period of time’. 
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The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(CESCR) interprets the principle as imposing minimum core obligations to 
provide, at the least, essential levels of each of the rights. In regard to 
arbitrary displacement, some of the rights entail obligations that have an 
immediate effect, regardless of the state of development of a country.46 The 
Committee has for example underlined that: 
[I]n view of the nature of the practice of forced evictions, the reference in 
article 2.1 to progressive achievement based on the availability of resources 
will rarely be relevant. The State itself must refrain from forced evictions 
and ensure that the law is enforced against its agents or third parties who 
carry out forced evictions.47  
Moreover, this approach is reinforced by article 17.1 of the ICCPR, which 
recognises, inter alia, the right to be protected against ‘arbitrary or unlawful 
interference’ with one’s home.48 In General Comment No. 7, the Committee 
has defined forced eviction as: 
[T]he permanent or temporary removal against their will of individuals, 
families and/or communities from the homes and/or land which they occupy, 
without the provision of, and access to, appropriate forms of legal or other 
protection.49  
Whereas some evictions may be justifiable, the relevant authorities are still 
obliged to ensure that they are carried out in accordance with a law which is 
compatible with the Covenant and that all the legal recourses and remedies 
are available to those affected. Even though a number of human rights offer 
legal protection against arbitrary forms of displacement, the right to housing 
is generally concerned to be the right which offers the most satisfactory 
safeguards.  
 
The Right to Adequate Housing 
Explicitly recognised in article 12 of the ICESCR, the right to adequate 
housing is considered to be the principal right for safeguarding individuals’ 
rights not to be arbitrarily displaced.50 The CESCR has emphasised that 
‘evictions may be carried out in connection with […] development and 
infrastructure projects, such as the construction of dams or other large-
                                                
46 Ibid., para. 10. See also para 9, ‘[...] the fact that realization over time, or in other words 
progressively, is foreseen under the Covenant should not be misinterpreted as depriving the 
obligation of all meaningful content’. 
47 CESCR, General Comment No. 7: The right to adequate housing (Art.11.1): forced 
evictions, 20 May 1997, E/1998/22, para 8. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid., para 3. 
50 ICESCR, article 11(1) reads ‘The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the 
right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including 
adequate [...] housing [...]’. 
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scale energy projects’.51 Limitations on the right to housing must however 
be in accordance with domestic law, have a substantive and proper 
justification, and be reasonable and proportional. Proper justification is, 
according to the Committee ‘solely for the purpose of promoting the general 
welfare in a democratic society.52  
The CESCR has in its General Comment 4 and 7 clarified the 
safeguards that are protected by the right to housing in relation to forced 
evictions and displacement.53 These include legal security of tenure as a 
core aspect of the right to adequate housing. 54 The Committee has stated: 
[T]enure takes a variety of forms, including rental (public and private) 
accommodation, cooperative housing, lease, owner-occupation, emergency 
housing and informal settlements, including occupation of land or property. 
Notwithstanding the type of tenure, all persons should possess a degree of 
security of tenure which guarantees legal protection against forced eviction, 
harassment and other threats.55  
Instances of forced eviction are, according to the Committee, incompatible 
with the requirements of the Covenant and can only be justified in the most 
exceptional circumstances, and in accordance with the relevant principles of 
international law.56 Where it may be necessary to impose limitations on the 
right to adequate housing, this must be in accordance with domestic law, 
have a substantive and proper justification, and be reasonable and 
proportional.57  
Prior to any displacements, and particularly those involving 
forced evictions of large groups, all feasible alternatives must be explored to 
avoid the need to use force. In addition the following procedural guarantees 
must be provided; an opportunity for genuine consultation with those 
affected; adequate and reasonable notice for all affected persons prior to the 
scheduled date of eviction; information on the proposed evictions and the 
alternative purpose for which the land or housing is to be used; government 
officials or their representatives to be present during an eviction; all persons 
carrying out the eviction to be properly identified; evictions not to take 
place in particularly bad weather or at night; provision of legal remedies, 
                                                
51 CESCR, General Comment No. 7, para 7. 
52 Ibid. 
53 CESCR, General Comment No. 4: The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11(1)), 13 
December 1991, para 8; CESCR, General Comment No. 7, para 13-15. 
54 CESCR, General Comment No. 4, para. 8. 
55 Ibid., para. 8(a). 
56 CESCR, General Comment No. 7, para 11. 
57 W. Kilin & J. Kiinzli, The Law of International Human Rights Protection, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009, page. 114-120. 
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and of legal aid to persons who are in need of it to seek redress from the 
courts.58  
 
2.4.2 International standards 
In addition to the human rights framework, there are a number of normative 
instruments that contain standards relating to development-induced 
displacement. These are not binding upon states, however, they are an 
indication that development-induced displacement are increasingly being 
considered as a human rights issue.59 The increased focus on development-
induced displacement requires states to limit their own actions and the 
actions of those under their legal jurisdiction in order to reduce adverse 
impacts upon the livelihoods of persons dislocated by development-induced 
displacement. 
Two soft-law instruments are of particular relevance. The first 
instrument is the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement from 1998,60 of which Principle 6 states that ‘every human 
being shall have the right to be protected against being arbitrarily displaced 
from his or her home or place of habitual residence.’61 It explicitly 
recognises ‘cases of large-scale development projects, which are not 
justified by compelling and overriding public interests’62 as a prohibited 
form of displacement. The Guiding Principles provides starting point for 
arguing that people should not be forced to flee their homes by development 
projects. 
The second instrument relating to development-induced 
displacement is the Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development-Based 
Evictions and Displacement from 2007.63 These guidelines contain a list of 
state responsibilities. Among the listed responsibilities are the obligations to 
‘adopt appropriate legislative and policy measures to ensure the protection 
of individuals, groups and communities from evictions that are not in 
                                                
58 CESCR, General Comment No. 7, paras 10-16. 
59 Dawson, Grant & Farber, Sonia (2012), page 146-147. 
60 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement, 22 July 1998, principle 6.  
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a 
component of the right to an adequate standard of living, Annex I Basic Principles and 
Guidelines on Development Based Evictions and Displacement, A/HRC/4/18. The 
guidelines were contained within a report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on 
Adequate Housing to the Human Rights Council. 
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conformity with existing international human rights standards’;64 and to 
‘explore fully all possible alternatives to eviction’.65  
These documents highlight that states, even where a 
development project is justified by public interest, before undertaking a 
development project must ensure that all feasible development alternatives 
are explored, persons likely to be displaced by the project are consulted and 
socio-economic and environmental impact assessments are approved. States 
must further ensure that the displacement be mandated and carried out in 
accordance with domestic law and that adequate compensation and legal 
remedies are guaranteed. Thus, where it is justified and no feasible 
alternatives exist, states must still take all necessary measures to minimise 
displacement and mitigate its adverse effects.  
                                                
64 Ibid., para 23. 
65 Ibid., para 38. 
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3 Bridging Development-
Induced Displacement to the 
Crime Against Humanity 
This chapter attempts to bridge the alleged crime of development-induced 
displacement to the international criminal framework of the crime against 
humanity in general and the crime of forcible transfer of population in 
particular. Although, there is a conspicuous lack of state practice, there is 
increasingly international recognition that development-induced 
displacement has many of the same effects upon the displaced as other 
groups who have been forcibly displaced. 
The first section is concerned with the development of the 
crime against humanity through the last decades; it attempts to explain how 
the crime has evolved and why development-related crimes have not been a 
point of focus in the otherwise rapid expansion of the crime. The second 
section focuses on two debated questions relating to the definition of crime 
against humanity through forcible transfer of population. These are, firstly, 
if arbitrary transfer of population from one area to another within the same 
state, and secondly, whether transfer occurring during peacetime, are 
included in the definition. Finally, the third section presents a growing 
coherent basis affirmatively establishing development-induced displacement 
as a crime against humanity through forcible transfer of population. 
 
3.1 A brief background on the Crime 
against humanity 
The concept of crimes against humanity has evolved over the past decades, 
mainly beginning after World War II.66 Thus, the impact of World War II in 
defining crimes against humanity cannot be underestimated. The post-war 
efforts, such as the Nuremberg Charter and the Tokyo Charter, went a long 
way in shaping the scope of international criminal law. However, they have 
also narrowed the conception of international crimes targeted in 
international criminal law to date. The development of international crimes 
has continuously focused on direct forms of international crimes while 
ignoring other areas such as development-related crimes, for example 
widespread destruction of the environment and land grabbing, which have 
                                                
66 Murphy, Sean D., (2015), page 12, para 28. 
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resulted in substantial numbers of deaths, in some cases on a scale 
comparable to persecution or genocide.  
Although efforts have been made to define crimes against 
humanity, there is, to date, no single recognised definition of the crime in 
customary international law.67 The scope of crime against humanity has 
evolved over time, however there are some features that seems to be a core 
aspect of the crime. In 1965 Hannah Arendt characterised the Holocaust as a 
‘new crime, the crime against humanity - in the sense of a crime “against 
human status” or against the very nature of mankind.’68 Fifty years later 
this core aspect of the crime against humanity is still accepted. In the ILC’s 
report on crimes against humanity from 201569, the Commission affirmed 
that the concept is generally seen to have two broad features: 
 [F]irst, the crime is so heinous that it is viewed as an attack on the very 
quality of being human. Second, the crime is so heinous that it is an attack 
not just upon the immediate victims, but also against all humanity, and 
hence the entire community of humankind has an interest in its punishment.70  
Important interpretations have also been made in the statutes 
and jurisprudence of contemporary international criminal tribunals, such as 
the ICTY and ICTR, and not least, in the Rome Statute and the 
jurisprudence of the ICC.71 The codification and application of the crime 
against humanity contains several basic elements that are common across 
the majority of definitions of the crime.72 In ILC’s report from 2015 the 
following is acknowledged: 
 [T]he crime is an international crime; it matters not whether the national 
law of the territory in which the act was committed has criminalized the 
conduct. The crime is directed against a civilian population and hence has a 
certain scale or systematic nature that generally extends beyond isolated 
incidents of violence or crimes committed for purely private purposes. The 
crime can be committed within the territory of a single State or can be 
committed across borders. Finally, the crime concerns the most heinous acts 
of violence and persecution known to humankind.73 
In the commentary of the draft code from 1994,74 the ILC 
noted that it was their understanding that: 
                                                
67 Ibid. 
68 Arendt, Hannah, Eichmann in Jerusalem: a report on the banality of evil, Viking Press, 
New York, 1963, page 268. 
69 See Chapter 1.5 for more information on the report. 
70 Murphy, Sean D., (2015), page 12, para 27. 
71 Ibid., page 12, para 28. 
72 Ibid., page 13, para 28.  
73 Ibid. 
74 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, 
Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/10, at 40 (1994). 
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[T]he definition of crimes against humanity encompasses inhumane acts of a 
very serious character involving widespread or systematic violations aimed 
at the civilian population in whole or in part. The hallmarks of such crimes 
lie in their large-scale and systematic nature. The particular forms of 
unlawful act are less crucial to the definition than the factors of scale and 
deliberate policy, as well as in their being targeted against the civilian 
population in whole or in part.75  
In light of these developments, it is well established under 
customary international law that an individual who commits acts 
constituting crimes against humanity can be held liable for those acts.76 
However, exactly what amounts to a crime against humanity is continuously 
a matter of discussion, as the definition throughout history has reflected and 
evolved to cover the latest atrocities of humankind. Thus, there is no 
consensus as to what crimes are so heinous that the international community 
has a common interest in punishing them. The lack of consensus can be 
used to narrow the scope of the crime to only the enumerated acts in 
different statutes. However, it can be argued that acts, carried out in ways 
limited only by the human imagination for cruelty and that violate 
fundamental human right, are inherently a crime against humanity if carried 
out in a widespread or systematic manner and is directed against a civilian 
population. 
 
3.2 Displacement as an international 
crime  
In the following section two essential aspects trying to link development-
induced displacement to the crime against humanity will be addressed. 
Firstly, if arbitrary transfers of population from one area to another within 
the same state, and secondly, whether transfer occurring during peacetime, 
is included in the crime.  
Starting with the first aspect, although deportation has long 
been recognised as a crime against humanity in the major international 
criminal instruments,77 prior to the Rome Statute, international criminal law 
did not distinguish between the crime of deportation, defined as ‘the forced 
removal of people from one country to another’, and the crime of forced 
                                                
75 Ibid., at 14. 
76 It was indicated by ICTY in Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Trial Chamber, 1 May 1997, 
Case no IT-94-1-T, page 233, para 626, ‘since the Nuremberg Charter, the customary 
status of the prohibition against crimes against humanity and the attribution of individual 
criminal responsibility for their commission have not been seriously questioned’. 
77 Including the Nuremberg Charter, the Tokyo Charter, the Allied Control Council Law 
No. 10, and the statutes of the ICTY and ICTR. 
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population transfer, defined as the ‘compulsory movement of people from 
one area to another within the same State’.78  
The ICTY stated in the Prosecutor v. Stakic79 that deportation 
requires a displacement across state borders.80 Such interpretation would in 
most cases result in the exclusion of development-induced displacement in 
crime against humanity trials. However, the Court confirmed that population 
transfers not meeting these criteria could nonetheless merit a conviction for 
the separate crime of inhuman acts. In Prosecutor v. Krnojelac81, the 
Appeals Chamber held that acts of forcible displacement underlying the 
crime of persecution were not limited to displacements across a national 
border. It further stated that ‘the prohibition against forcible displacements 
aims at safeguarding the right and aspiration of individuals to live in their 
communities and homes without outside interference.’82 The Appeals 
Chamber emphasised that it is ‘the forced character of displacement and the 
forced uprooting of the inhabitants of a territory’83 that entail ‘the criminal 
responsibility of the perpetrator, not the destination to which these 
inhabitants are sent.’84 In later jurisprudence, the definition of deportation 
as a crime against humanity has, in several cases, included the crime of 
forced population transfer within a state’s borders.85  
When the Rome Statute was adopted, forcible transfer of 
population was included ‘to make it expressly clear that transfers of 
populations within a State's borders were also covered’.86  Thus, it is clear 
that the internal element of development-induced displacement itself should 
not exclude the alleged crime from being tried as a crime against humanity. 
 Moving on to the second question regarding crimes carried out 
in peacetime. Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute defines crimes against 
                                                
78 Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic, ICTY, Trial Chamber, 2 August 2001, Case No. IT-98-33-
T, para 521; see also para 522, stating that ‘this distinction has no bearing on the 
condemnation of such practices in international humanitarian law. Article 2(g) of the 
Statute, Articles 49 and of the Geneva Convention concerning the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention), Article 85(4)(a) of Additional 
Protocol I, Article 18 of the ILC Draft Code and Article 7(1)(d) of the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court all condemn deportation or forcible transfer of protected 
persons.
 
Article 17 of Protocol II likewise condemns the “displacement” of civilians’. 
79 Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 22 March 2006, Case No. IT-97-
24-A. 
80 Ibid., paras 288-303.  
81 Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac, Appeals Chamber, 17 September 2003, Case No. IT-97-
25-A. 
82 Ibid., para 218. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
85 See e.g. Prosecutor v. Radilslav Krstic (2001), para 521. 
86 Lee, Roy S. (edit.), The International Criminal Court: the making of the Rome Statute: 
issues, negotiations, results, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1999, page 86. 
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humanity as an act ‘when committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the 
attack’.87 The crime, as defined in the Rome Statute, does not retain the 
nexus to an armed conflict that characterised the statute of the ICTY.88 The 
fact that the Rome Statute includes crimes of forcible transfer during 
peacetime creates a ground for arguing that development-induced 
displacement constitutes a crime against humanity. This is further supported 
by the Court’s jurisprudence. In 2010 the ICC investigated a case of forcible 
transfer in Kenya.89 From December 2007 to February 2008, approximately 
350,000 people were displaced within the borders of Kenya as the result of 
post-election violence.90 
 In addition, the Appeal Chamber of the ICTY in Prosecutor v. 
Tadić91 clarified that there is no logical or legal basis for retaining a 
connection to armed conflict, since Nuremberg had been discarded in state 
practice. It also held that: 
[I]t is by now a settled rule of customary international law that crimes 
against humanity do not require a connection to international armed 
conflict. Indeed, as the Prosecutor points out, customary international law 
may not require a connection between crimes against humanity and any 
conflict at all.92 
 
3.3 Creating a case 
As shown in the previous section, development-induced displacement has 
not been a point of focus in the evolution of international criminal law. 
However, recent indications suggest that there has been a shift of focus in 
international law. One of the most recent of such indications is the ICC’s 
Office of the Prosecutor’s (OTP) policy paper on case selection and 
                                                
87 Rome Statue, article 7(1). 
88 ICTY Statue, article 5(1), stating that ‘The International Tribunal shall have the power to 
prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes when committed in armed conflict, 
whether international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian 
population’. 
89 Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an 
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC, Pre-Trial Chamber II, 31 
March 2010, Case No. ICC-01/09, (hereinafter Kenya Authorization Decision 2010). 
90 The accused were discharged from the process in 2016 due to an incidence of witness 
interference and political meddling that was reasonable likely to intimidate witnesses.  
91 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction, ICTY, Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72. 
92 Ibid., para 140. 
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prioritisation from September 2016.93 In the new policy, the OTP mentions 
destruction of the environment, illegal exploitation of natural resources and 
illegal dispossession of land to be prioritised in case selection, emphasising 
that: 
[T]he Office will give particular consideration to prosecuting Rome Statute 
crimes that are committed by means of, or that result in, inter alia, the 
destruction of the environment, the illegal exploitation of natural resources 
or the illegal dispossession of land.94  
Indications from the international community suggest that there is an 
increasing interest in development-induced displacement. In 2010, Walter 
Kälin, the former Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human 
Rights of Internally Displaced Persons, included a section on persons that 
are internally displaced by development in his final report to the Human 
Rights Council.95 He noted that: 
[T]he stereotypical image of internally displaced persons, reinforced by 
media reports, remains that of people who flee conflict areas and end up 
destitute in camps or collective shelters. The reality is far more complex. 
Every year more people are displaced by natural disasters and development 
projects than by conflict and violence.96  
The Human Rights Council, to whom the Rapporteur on the Human Rights 
of Internally Displaced Persons reports, and one of the foremost entities 
addressing violations of human rights within the UN system, has also 
devoted new attention to development-induced displacement. In 2000, the 
Human Rights Commission appointed a Special Rapporteur on Adequate 
Housing; and, in 2001, it appointed a Special Rapporteur on the Situation of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People. The 
mandates of both Rapporteurs include reporting on persons displaced by 
development.97  
The Human Rights Council intensified its focus on 
development-induced displacement in 2007, when it adopted a set of 
guidelines addressing forced displacement caused by development. The 
guidelines begin by noting that: 
[F]orced evictions share many consequences similar to those resulting from 
arbitrary displacement, including population transfer, mass expulsions, 
                                                
93 ICC Office of the prosecutor, Policy paper on case selection and prioritisation, 15 
September 2016. 
94 Ibid., para 40-41. 
95 Kälin, W, Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of 
Internally Displaced Persons, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc A/HRC/13/21, 5 January 
2010.  
96 Ibid., page 11. 
97 Dawson, Grant & Farber, Sonia (2012), page 134. 
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mass exodus, ethnic cleansing and other practices involving the coerced and 
involuntary displacement of people from their homes, lands and 
communities.98 
Although, there is a conspicuous lack of state practice, the 
increasing involvement of the United Nations reflects a potential turning 
point for development-induced displacement.99 Furthermore, the OTP’s 
policy paper case selection and the increasing international recognition that 
development-induced displacement has many of the same effects upon the 
displaced, as other groups that are forcibly displaced; thus, presents a 
growing coherent basis for affirmatively establishing development-induced 
displacement as a crime against humanity.  
It is possible to argue that international criminal law presents 
an opportunity for the international community to begin vindicating the 
development-related crimes. This is substantiated by the fact that the 
drafters of the Rome Statute believed that the term’s fluidity would account 
for progressive development that would capture previously unimagined 
crimes of such magnitude.100 Indeed, this indicates that the scope of crimes 
against humanity is intended to be interpreted in light of modern norms. The 
desire for flexibility is further highlighted by the inclusion of ‘other 
inhumane acts’. In its case Prosecutor v. Kuprelkic the ICTY explained that 
other inhumane acts was ‘designed as a residual category, as it was felt to 
be undesirable for this category to be exhaustively enumerated. An 
exhaustive categorization would merely create opportunities for evasion of 
the letter of the prohibition’.101 Thus, even if a particular act or omission has 
not yet been prosecuted or explicitly defined as a crime against humanity, it 
is by no means precluded from being characterised as one in the future.  
 
                                                
98 Report of the Special Rapporteur on adequate housing as a component of the right to an 
adequate standard of living, Annex I Basic Principles and Guidelines on Development 
Based Evictions and Displacement, page 15. 
99 Dawson, Grant & Farber, Sonia (2012), page 147. 
100 Robinson Darryl, Defining “Crimes Against Humanity” at the Rome Conference, The 
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 93, No. 1, pp. 43-57 (1999), page 54-57. 
101 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., ICTY, Trial Chamber, 14 January 2000, Case No IT-95-
16, para 563. 
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4 Crime of Forcible Transfer of 
Population 
As indicated in the previous chapter, the definition of crimes against 
humanity in general and forcible transfer of population in particular has 
been subject to different formulations over the past decades.102 According to 
the ILC the most widely accepted formulation is that of article 7 of the Rome 
Statute, stating: 
[F]or the purpose of this Statute, ‘crime against humanity’ means any of the 
following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: […] 
(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population; […].103  
In this chapter the elements of the crime of forcible transfer of will be 
examined and analysed to show how they can apply to cases of 
development-induced displacement.  
This chapter presents the prerequisites that must be satisfied 
for an act to constitute a crime against humanity. Firstly examining the 
prohibited act and secondly, the contextual elements of the crime. The 
contextual elements have been divided into four parts, these are that the act 
is (1) part of a widespread or systematic attack, (2) directed against any 
civilian population, (3) pursuant to or in furtherance of a policy and (4) 
carried out with knowledge of the attack. The examination will take its 
starting point in the definition of the crime as it is presented in the Rome 
Statute and further move on to consider deviant customary elements of the 
crime.  
 
4.1 The prohibited act 
There is no internationally recognised, legally binding definition of the term 
‘forcible transfer.’ However, all population transfers have the common 
feature of large-scale movement of groups of people. In order to distinguish 
population transfer from other migratory processes, the involuntary or 
                                                
102 Murphy, Sean D., (2015), page 6, para 8. 
103 Rome Statue, Article 7. 
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forced character of transfer must be considered.104 However, drawing a clear 
line between voluntary and involuntary population transfers can be difficult. 
If a voluntary population transfer is triggered by the action or inaction of a 
State, making living conditions so difficult for certain population groups 
that they prefer to migrate, this may not be considered a voluntary process.  
‘Forcible transfer of a population’ is recognised as a crime 
against humanity in a broad range of instruments.105 In article 7(2)(d) of the 
Rome Statute, deportation or forcible transfer of population is defined as 
‘forced displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or other 
coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, without 
grounds permitted under international law’. This definition is accordingly 
based on three cumulative conditions: (1) forcible character; (2) lawful 
presence of the displaced; (3) absence of grounds permitted under 
international law. If one of these conditions is absent, the act is not 
considered a crime of ‘forcible transfer of population’.106 
The limited scope means that not all large-scale movements of 
people constitute a crime. Justifications such as voluntariness, national 
welfare and temporariness are regularly offered, but should be considered 
carefully as they often conceal a wish to disguise the criminal elements of 
the act.   
 
4.1.1 Forcible character of the displacement 
‘Forcible transfer of population’ must be forced in order to be a crime 
against humanity.107 However, ‘forced’ does not require actual physical 
force, but includes the threat of force or coercion, physiological oppression, 
or other means of rendering displacement involuntary.108 Thus, the forcible 
                                                
104 This is reflected in Article 3 of the United Nations Population Transfer Declaration, 
which defines unlawful population transfer as ‘a practice or policy having the purpose or 
effect of moving persons into or out of an area, either within or across an international 
border, or within, into or out of an occupied territory without the free and informed consent 
of the transferred population and any receiving population’. 
105 Including the ICTY Statute, article 5(d); the ICTR Statute, Article 3(d); the Statute of 
the Special Court of Sierra Leone, article 2(d); UN TAET Regulation 2000/15 on the 
establishment of the Cambodian Extraordinary Courts, section 5.1(d); and the Rome 
Statute, article 7(1)(d). 
106 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al. (2000), para. 566. 
107 ICC, Elements of Crimes, 2011, article 7(1)(d); Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic (2001), 
para 281; Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac (2003), para 475. 
108 Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic (2006), para 281; Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac (2003), 
para 475; see also ICC, Elements of Crimes, Art 7(1)(d) suggesting that a broad definition 
of the forcible character is included, ‘such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, 
detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power against such person or persons or 
another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment’. 
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character of displacement can be inferred from surrounding circumstances. 
Coercive pressures on people to flee their homes can include ‘destruction of 
their homes, and other acts of persecution, such as depriving members of a 
group of employment, [and] denying them access to schools.’109  
Large-scale development projects are often based on the same 
model. Development corporations on one side and governments on the other 
side enter into an agreement in which the corporation is contracted to carry 
out a development project. The land acquired for the project is, however, 
inhabited by local residents. Thus, to realise the development plans, the 
local residents must vacate the area. Even though residents may be 
requested to leave their homes, they are not afforded a real option, since any 
resistance to the request will lead to forced evictions. Furthermore, if the 
area concerned is considered public land it may result in denial of access to 
legal remedies or compensation for the affected people.110 
Thus, an important component of the term ‘forcible’ is, as 
stated by the ICTY, that ‘the displacement of persons is only illegal where it 
is forced, i.e. not voluntary’.111 This may seem like an obvious observation. 
However, it is not unusual in cases of displacement, as described above, that 
the responsible actor claims that the transfer was carried out with consent 
from the affected persons. Thus, even in cases of voluntary departure, it is 
of importance to establish real consent of the persons concerned.112 The fact 
that a person has expressed consent does not eliminate the need for an 
inquiry into the genuine voluntary nature of such consent.113 In the case of 
Prosecutor v. Simic et al114, the ICTY stated that ‘an apparent consent 
induced by force or threat of force should not be considered to be real 
consent’.115 
 
4.1.2 Lawfully present 
The second constitutive element of ‘forcible transfer of population’ requires 
the lawful presence of the affected people in the area from where they are 
                                                
109 Triffterer, Otto, Ambos, Kai, Bassiouni, M.Cherif & Schabs, William A. 
(red.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: observers' 
notes, article by article, 1. Aufl., Nomos-Verl.-Ges., Baden-Baden, 1999, page 162. 
110  Ibid. 
111 Prosecutor v. Simic et al., ICTY, Trial Chamber II, 17 October 2003, Case No. IT-95-9-
T, para. 125. 
112 Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac (2003), para. 229. 
113 Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic (2006), para.279. 
114 Prosecutor v. Simic et al., ICTY, Trial Chamber II, 17 October 2003, Case No. IT-95-9-
T. 
115 Prosecutor v. Simic et al. (2003), para.125. 
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transferred. The notion of ‘lawfully present’ does however not equate with 
that of residence or landownership.  
It is not clear in customary international law whether or not 
‘lawfully present’ is limited to domestic law. Though it has not been 
confirmed in state practice or in jurisprudence of the international tribunals, 
most doctrinal sources consider that lawful presence must be assessed not 
only on the basis of domestic law but also by reference to international law. 
Taking into account the rules of interpretations enshrined in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, seen to the object and purpose of the 
crime against humanity, the only fair conclusion is that ‘lawfully present’ 
can not be determined on the sole ground of domestic law. 
Any other reading would make the definition of deportation meaningless as 
it would permit a government to declare that the people to be deported were 
not “lawfully present” in the territory of a State […] and escape 
international criminal responsibility.116 
The ICCPR and ICESCR contains several provisions that refer to ‘law’ and 
‘lawfulness’. Of particular relevance is the right to adequate housing in 
article 11(1) ICESCR. In interpreting this provision, CESCR has underlined 
that in cases where justification of evictions are considered, ‘it should be 
carried out in strict compliance with the relevant provisions of international 
human rights law and in accordance with general principles of 
reasonableness and proportionality’.117 The Human Rights Committee 
(HRC) has also deliberated on the term ‘law’. In General Comment no 16, 
the HRC underlined that ‘law’ ‘should be in accordance with the provisions, 
aims and objectives of the Covenant and should be, in any event, reasonable 
in the particular circumstances’.118  
Taking all this into consideration, it is reasonable to conclude 
that ‘lawfully present’ relates to domestic law, provided that the law is in 
compliance with the state’s international obligations. Any other conclusion 
would allow the states to displace people, as long as pre-established 
domestic laws existed.  
 
                                                
116 Triffterer, Otto, Ambos, Kai, Bassiouni, M.Cherif & Schabs, William A. (edit.) (1999), 
page 248. 
117 CESCR, General Comment No. 7, para 14. 
118 HRC, General Comment No. 16, para 4; emphasised in CESCR, General Comment No. 
7, para 14. 
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4.1.3 Absence of grounds permitted under 
international law 
The last requirement is ‘absence of grounds permitted under international 
law’. Most states carry out legitimate acts of deportation and forcible 
transfer of population on a frequent basis, e.g. deportations of aliens, not 
lawfully present in the territory of the state. Thus there are circumstances 
under which forcible transfer of population is permitted.  
  It is clear that the general reference to international law 
encompasses international human rights law. This is required by the very 
object and purpose of the crime against humanity, which is conventionally 
viewed as an implementation of human rights norms within international 
criminal law.119 Most human rights instruments permit states to place 
restrictions on the rights of people when specific circumstances are met.  
The CESCR has stated, in relation to the right to adequate 
housing, that there are situations where it may be necessary to impose 
limitations.120 Limitations must however be in accordance with domestic 
law, have a substantive and proper justification, and be reasonable and 
proportional. Proper justification is, according to the Committee ‘solely for 
the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic society’.121 
Thus, the right to development could be argued constituting a ground 
permitted under international law. However, the right to development is not 
an absolute right but must be balanced against the rights of the forcible 
transferred persons in order to be proportional. 
Limitations on the freedom of residence and movement may 
also be imposed by states when specific circumstances are met. The ICCPR 
provides that the freedom of movement and choice of residence: 
[S]hall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by 
law, are necessary to protect national security, public order, public health 
or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the 
other rights recognized in the present Covenant.122  
Thus, arguing for an overriding public interest of development may not be 
enough to constitute a ground permitted under international law. Even in the 
case where public interest of development overrides individuals wishes to 
remain in an area, displacement may still not be carried out in a manner 
which is inconsistent with other rights, such as the right to security of the 
person, the right to non-interference with privacy, family and home and the 
right to effective remedies.  
                                                
119 See e.g. Rome Statue, Article 21(3). 
120 CESCR, General Comment No. 7, para 5. 
121 Ibid. 
122 ICCPR, article 12. 
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Development-induced displacement, as discussed in chapter 
two, often violates central human rights of the potential and actual 
victims.123 The people being displaced are often not compensated or offered 
shelter, leaving them without social and economic security. Forcible transfer 
of population carried out in such way is not in accordance with international 
human rights law and can therefore not be justified under international law. 
 The criminality of the act depends on the purpose for and 
means by which the perpetrator accomplishes the forced transfer.124 For 
example, if the transfer is motivated by development and accomplished with 
due regard for human rights, characterisation as a crime against humanity is 
unlikely. On the contrary, a brutal transfer even for purportedly justifiable 
reasons of development would however most likely amount to an unlawful 
act. 
 
4.2 Contextual elements of the crime 
4.2.1  Widespread or systematic attack 
The requirement that the act must be part of a ‘widespread or systematic 
attack’ first appeared in the statute of the ICTR, however; the ICTY also 
maintained that the requirement was implicit.125 This is also reflected in the 
ILC’s commentary of the 1996 draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind, where the ILC stated that acts constituted a crime 
against humanity ‘when committed in a systematic manner or on a large 
scale’.126 ‘Committed in a systematic manner’ criminalises acts which are 
conducted pursuant to a preconceived plan or policy. Thus, random acts 
which are not committed as part of a broader plan or policy, or committed 
by a person acting on his or her own initiative, are excluded. ‘On a large 
scale’, targets acts which are directed against a multiplicity of victims. 
Isolated inhumane acts directed against a single victim are accordingly 
disqualified.  
It is firmly established in customary law that widespread or 
systematic is a disjunctive requirement.127 Jurisprudence from ICTY and 
ICTR establishes ‘widespread’ and ‘systematic’ as disjunctive, meaning that 
                                                
123 Terminski, Bogumil (2015), page 473. 
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Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic (2006), para 278. 
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Chamber, 3 March 2000, Case No. IT-95-14-T, para. 202. 
126 ILC (1996), at 47.  
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either condition may be met to establish the existence of the crime.128 Once 
either requirement is met, it is not necessary to consider whether the 
alternative requirement is also satisfied.129 ICC has in its Kenya 
Authorization Decision from 2010 stated that ‘this contextual element [of 
widespread or systematic] applies disjunctively, such that the alleged acts 
must be either widespread or systematic to warrant classification as crimes 
against humanity’.130   
The assessment of what constitutes a ‘widespread’ or 
‘systematic’ attack is dependent on the interpretation of these terms.131 
Guidance can, to some extent, be found in the jurisprudence of the 
international courts. For example, in Prosecutor v. Kunarac132 the ICTY 
emphasised that: 
A Trial Chamber must first identify the population which object of the attack 
and, in light of the means, methods, resources, and result of the attack upon 
the population, ascertain whether the attack was indeed widespread or 
systematic. The consequences of the attack upon the targeted population, the 
number of victims, the nature of the acts, the possible participation of 
officials or authorities of any identifiable patterns of crimes, could be taken 
into account to determine whether the attack satisfies either or both 
requirements of a ‘widespread’ or ‘systematic’ attack vis-à-vis this civilian 
population.133  
These elements will be further elaborated on in the following sections. 
 
Widespread 
The adjective ‘widespread’ implies the large-scale nature of an attack and 
the number of targeted persons.134 According to the ICTY ‘the adjective 
“widespread” connotes the large-scale nature of the attack and the number 
of targeted persons’.135 This requirement excludes isolated acts of violence, 
                                                
128 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (1998), ICTR, Trial Chamber, 2 September 
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by persons acting on their own will as opposed to as part of a broader 
initiative.136  
‘Widespread’ contains two key dimensions. Firstly, it can be a 
matter of the numbers of victims affected. According to the ICC there is 
however no specific numerical threshold of victims that must be met for an 
attack to be deemed widespread.137 In light of the means, methods, 
resources and result of the attack upon the population, such as the size of the 
civilian population that was allegedly attacked, it can be determined whether 
the attack was widespread.138 Secondly, ‘widespread’ can be in relation to 
the size of the geographical area in which the attack is carried out or to the 
attack occurring in different locations. For example, in the Bemba case139, 
the ICC found that there was sufficient evidence to establish that an attack 
was ‘widespread’ on the basis of reports of attacks in various locations over 
a large geographical area.140  
 The number of victims affected and the size of the 
geographical area can have a cumulative effect. The ICC has emphasised 
that ‘the assessment is neither exclusively quantitative nor geographical, but 
must be carried out on the basis of the individual facts’.141  However, it is 
not required that both dimensions are realised for an act to be considered 
‘widespread’. Thus, a ‘widespread’ attack can for example be in a small 
geographical area but against a large number of victims or vice versa.142  
 
Systematic 
Similar to the term ‘widespread’, the term ‘systematic’ excludes isolated 
acts of violence. Coherent jurisprudence of the ICTY, ICTR and ICC 
establishes that systematic refers to the organized nature of acts of violence, 
such as a pattern or methodical plan making the random occurrence of the 
acts improbable.143  
 In addition, the ILC has in its commentary to the 1996 draft 
Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, stated that the 
‘systematic’ requires that the inhumane acts are committed ‘pursuant to a 
preconceived plan or policy’144 and that the ‘implementation of this plan or 
policy could result in the repeated or continuous commission of inhuman 
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acts’.145 The ICC has also emphasised the term ‘systematic’ in connection to 
a preconceived plan, stating that: 
 [Systematic] has been understood as either an organized plan in 
furtherance of a common policy, which follows a regular pattern and results 
in a continuous commission of acts, or as ‘patterns of crimes’ such that the 
crimes constitute a “non-accidental repetition of similar criminal conduct on 
a regular basis.146 
If a group of perpetrators employs similar means and methods to attack 
different locations or they approach targeted groups simultaneously this may 
indicate that the acts are not occurring coincidentally. For example, the ICC 
has found an attack to be ‘systematic’ for the following reasons:  
[T]he perpetrators employed similar means and methods to attack the 
different locations: they approached the targets simultaneously, in 
large numbers, and from different directions, they attacked villages 
with heavy weapons, and systematically chased the population by 
similar methods, hunting house by house and into the bushes, burning 
all properties and looting.147 
In conclusion, ‘systematic’ implies that an attack is carried out in an 
organised manner.148 This can be established by either proof of a pattern or 
methodical plan or policy,149 or by the non-coincidental repetition of a 
similar criminal conduct on a regular basis.150  
 
Attack 
As defined under article 7(2) of the Rome Statute attack means ‘a course of 
conduct involving the multiple commission of acts’.151 These acts do not 
need to be carried out using violence or be organised by the military. This is 
emphasised in the Elements of Crimes of the ICC, which provides that the 
acts referred to ‘need not constitute a military attack’.152  
Development-induced displacement usually involves 
exploitation of huge land areas, which requires that local residents must be 
removed from the region. If the residents do not leave the area voluntarily it 
may result in forced evictions under the guise of the establishment of large 
development projects. In many cases, although being aware of the 
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consequences, governments not only support these projects, but may 
through their authorities, assist in the evictions. According to the ILC, 
deliberate failure to take actions may be assimilated with an attack, if the 
failure was aimed to encourage such an attack.153 This is emphasised in 
jurisprudence of the ICTY, ICTR and ICC.154 For example, in Prosecutor v. 
William Samei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang155, the ICC stated: 
However, there has been overall agreement that crimes against humanity 
are not isolated events that randomly occur (not spontaneous), but are the 
result from a deliberate attempt to target a civilian population, either by 
taking actions against civilians or deliberately abstaining to take action 
against such an attack.156  
In situations where a state intentionally encourages crimes 
through inaction the deliberate failure may amount to an attack. Thus, the 
most reasonable conclusion is that inactions can constitute a crime against 
humanity. Any other interpretation would lead to the conclusion that 
governmental actors, who deliberately fail to prevent the displacement of 
people through e.g. arbitrary evictions, cannot be held responsible under 
international criminal law.  
4.2.2 Directed against any civilian population 
Directed against 
The term ‘directed against’ emphasises that civilians must be the primary, 
rather than an incidental, target of an attack. The ICTY has, for example, 
repeatedly defined ‘directed against’ as ‘an expression, which ‘specifies that 
in the context of a crime against humanity the civilian population is the 
primary object of the attack’.157 In order to determine whether an attack may 
be said to be ‘directed against’ a civilian population ‘the means and method 
used in the course of the attack, the status of the victims, their number, the 
discriminatory nature of the attack, the nature of the crimes committed in its 
course’158 may be considered.  
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To establish whether a case of development-induced 
displacement is targeting a civilian population one must first ask whether 
the civilian population are the intended target of the attack. As for a 
development project, the intended outcome would usually not be an attack 
on the civilian population but rather economic welfare etc. However, the 
overall intention of the project is not to be confused with the intention of the 
attack carried out to achieve the goal of development. The attack is the act 
of displacement, not the development project as such.  
This conclusion is also supported by the ICC. The Court has 
found that there is sufficient evidence that an attack is ‘directed against’ the 
civilian population if the civilians are being attacked inside their houses or 
in their courtyards.159 Thus, being forcibly transferred through e.g. forced 
evictions carried out during night-time by demolition workers escorted by 
armed forces, the purpose of development may likewise constitute an attack.  
 
Any civilian population 
According to ILC the word ‘any’ indicates that ‘civilian population’ is to 
have a wide definition and should be interpreted broadly.160 The ‘civilian 
population’, which the attack is directed against, must not have a 
distinguishing feature. An attack can be committed against any civilian 
population, ‘regardless of their nationality, ethnicity or any other 
distinguishing feature’.161 The ILC has underlined that, during peacetime, 
‘civilian’ includes all persons.162 To establish whether a civilian population 
is targeted, the ICTY has further emphasised that it is the intention of the 
attack rather than the physical result of the attack that should be guiding the 
assessment.163 
Furthermore, ‘population’ does not require the entire 
population of a given geographical location to be subject to an attack.164 
Rather, the term implies the collective nature of the crime, meaning it is an 
                                                
159 Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (2009), para. 94: ‘having reviewed the 
Disclosed Evidence as a whole, the Chamber believes that there is sufficient evidence, in 
particular, statements of witnesses victimised […] establishing that civilians have been 
attacked often inside their houses or in their courtyards by armed MLC soldiers’.  
160 Murphy, Sean D., (2015), page 65, para 135; see also Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (1997), 
para. 643; Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., para. 547: ‘a wide definition of civilian and 
population is intended. This is warranted first of all by the object and purpose of the 
general principles and rules of humanitarian law, in particular by the rules prohibiting 
crimes against humanity’. 
161 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al, para. 423; Prosecutor v. Katanga (2008), para 
399: Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo 2009, para 76. 
162 Murphy, Sean D., (2015), page 66, para 135. 
163 See, e.g. Prosecutor v. Blaškić (2000), para. 401. 
164 Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (2009), para. 77: ‘the Prosecutor need not 
prove that the entire population of the geographical area, when the attack is taking place, 
was being targeted’.  
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attack upon multiple victims.165 Thus, it is sufficient to show that enough 
individuals were targeted or that they were targeted in such way that it is 
clear that the attack is directed against the population, rather than a limited 
and randomly selected number of individuals.166  
 
4.2.3 Pursuant to or in furtherance of a policy  
A policy element is required for the crime against humanity according to the 
Rome Statute.167 The requirement has been addressed in several cases 
before the ICC. The Court has emphasised that the policy required to 
establish a crime does not need to be formally established or declared in 
advance of an attack.168 Rather, the policy can be assumed from the 
repetition of acts, preparatory activities or collective mobilisation.169 Thus, 
the policy need not be concrete or precise, and may evolve over time.170  
 The ILC, in its first report on the crime against humanity from 
2015, includes the policy element as defined in the Rome Statute, in the 
definition of the crime against humanity.171 Suggesting that customary 
international law requires an attack to be pursuant to or in furtherance of a 
policy is however not all uncontroversial.  
                                                
165 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (1997), para. 644. 
166 Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic (2006) para 627; Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo 
(2009), para 77. 
167 Rome Statue, article 7(2)(a), stating that ‘Attack directed against any civilian 
population’ means a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred 
to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State 
or organizational policy to commit such attack’. 
168 Prosecutor v. William Samei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, ICC Trial Chamber, 5 April 
2016, Case No. ICC-01(09-01/11 para 301, stating: ‘it is possible - and sensible - to 
construe ‘organisational policy’ to mean no more than ‘coordinated course of action.’ The 
concept will thus include, as an attack against a civilian population, the conduct of one 
individual who executed multiple large-scale attacks against innocent civilians in a 
systematic way, or one planned large- scale attack that inflicted a widespread harm to a 
civilian population’. 
169 Prosecutor v. Katanga, Judgement pursuant to article 74 of the Statue, ICC, Trial 
Chamber II, 7 March 2014, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07para 1109, stating: ‘it is important to 
underline that it is relatively rare, although cannot be wholly excluded, that a State or 
organisation seeking to encourage an attack against a civilian population might adopt and 
disseminate a pre-established design or plan to that effect. In most cases, the existence of 
such a State or organisational policy can therefore be inferred by discernment of, inter 
alia, repeated actions occurring according to a same sequence, or the existence of 
preparations or collective mobilisation orchestrated and coordinated by that State or 
organisation’. 
170 Ibid., para 1110: ‘some aspects of the policy pursued against a civilian population will 
only crystallise and develop as actions are set in train and undertaken by the perpetrators’. 
171 Murphy, Sean D. (2015), page 84, para 177. 
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There are divergent opinions on whether the existence of a 
policy or plan constitutes a distinct legal requirement of the contextual 
elements of the crime against humanity. The statutes of the ICTY and the 
ICTR contain no policy requirement in the definition of crimes against 
humanity. However, in the early jurisprudence of the courts, the policy 
element was considered a constitutive element of crimes against 
humanity.172 In later jurisprudence, the policy element has been 
downplayed. Thus, ICTY and ICTR regard it as sufficient simply to prove 
the existence of a widespread or systematic attack.173 For example, in 
Prosecutor v. Kordic174, the ICTY stated that, ‘in the Chamber’s view, the 
existence of a plan or policy should better be regarded as indicative of the 
systematic character of offences charged as crimes against humanity’.175  
A systematic attack inevitably implies a policy element. 
However, in regard to a widespread attack the policy element raises the 
question as to how an attack can be widespread but not systematic, and still 
somehow be connected to a policy. In other words, can a widespread attack, 
which is not organised or planned, be the object of a policy? If the answer is 
no, the requirement of a policy leads to the conclusion that widespread is 
not disjunctive to systematic.  
Customary international law clearly provides for ‘widespread’ 
and ‘systematic’ in the alternative. ‘Widespread’ by its inherent meaning in 
customary international law lacks guidance and organisation. Thus, if 
‘pursuant to or in furtherance of a policy’ were interpreted in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning given to the term ‘policy’, the conclusion would 
be contradictory. A uniform interpretation of the crime against humanity 
under customary international law would instead be to accept ‘policy’ to 
consist of the deliberate denial of protection for victims of ‘widespread’ but 
unsystematic crimes, such as a ‘policy’ of toleration. 
Such interpretation would cover cases where government 
officials, who has the ability to intervene, adopts a ‘policy’ of toleration in 
regard to widespread atrocities carried out by internal or external actors. For 
example, this may be the case when large corporations, through different 
illegal means, force the transfer of the local residents from an area to gain 
easier access to natural resources or land for the purpose of large-scale 
development projects. If the government, for economic or political gain, 
consciously refrains from putting a stop to the forcible transfer of the 
population, this could then satisfy the policy requirement.  
 
                                                
172 Prosecutor v. Tadic (1997), para. 653; Prosecutor v. Akayesu (1998), para. 580. 
173 Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al. (2002), para. 98; Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu (1998), 
para. 580. 
174 Prosecutor v. Kordic (2004). 
175Ibid., supra note 52, para. 182. 
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The Entity behind the Policy 
Another question, which arises from the requirement of a policy, is which 
entity has authority to carry out a policy for it to be sufficient to constitute a 
crime against humanity. The ILC, commenting on the 1991 draft provision 
on crimes against humanity, stated: 
[ILC] does not rule out the possibility that private individuals with de facto 
power or organized in criminal gangs or groups might also commit the kind 
of systematic or mass violations of human rights covered by the article; in 
that case, their acts would come under the draft Code.176  
In the 1996 draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of 
Mankind, the ILC further defined crimes against humanity as an attack ‘[…] 
committed in a systematic manner or on a large scale and instigated or 
directed by a Government or by an organization or group’.177  
Article 7 of the Rome Statute explicitly contemplates crimes 
against humanity by non-state perpetrators. Jurisprudence from the ICC 
suggests that ‘organisational’ includes any organisation or group with the 
capacity and resources to plan and carry out a widespread or systematic 
attack.178 For example, in its Kenya Authorization Decision 2010179, the 
Court stated: 
[T]he formal nature of a group and the level of its organization should not 
be the defining criterion. Instead, as others have convincingly put forward, a 
distinction should be drawn about whether a group has the capability to 
perform acts which infringe on basic human values.180  
As such, the ICC rejected the idea that only State-like organisations may 
qualify as organisations for the purpose of article 7.181 In difference to the 
Rome Statute, neither the statutes of ICTY nor ICTR mentions a policy 
prerequisite, however, jurisprudence of the courts seems to have accepted 
the possibility of non-state actors being prosecuted for crimes against 
humanity. For example, in the Tadić case182, the ICTY stated that: 
                                                
176 ILC (1991), at 103-04. 
177 ILC (1996), at 47. 
178 Prosecutor v. Katanga (2008), para. 396, citing jurisprudence of ICTY and ICTR: 
‘accordingly, in the context of a widespread attack, the requirement of an organisational 
policy pursuant to article 7(2) (a) of the Statute ensures that the attack, […] must still be 
thoroughly organised and follow a regular pattern. […] Such a policy may be made either 
by groups of persons who govern a specific territory or by any organisation with the 
capability to commit a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population’; see 
also Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (2009), para. 81. 
179 Kenya Authorization Decision (2010). 
180 Ibid., para. 90. 
181 Ibid., para. 90. 
182 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (1997). 
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[T]he law in relation to crimes against humanity has developed to take into 
account forces which, although not those of the legitimate government, have 
de facto control over, or are able to move freely within, defined territory.183  
The organisation of large-scale development projects usually involves a 
large range of different actors. The various stakeholders of a development 
project may include local governments, municipal authorities, shareholders, 
development corporations, building corporations, property owners, etc. The 
state carries the primary responsibility for respecting, protecting and 
promoting the human rights of potentially affected people. The state has the 
primary responsibility under international human rights law to ensure that 
non-state actors are prevented from violating rights and that they are held 
accountable where breaches do occur. However, the jurisprudence from the 
international tribunals, although unambiguous, may suggests that private 
corporations and shareholders not directly linked to the state may also be 
considered as the entity behind the policy. Due to the lack of state practice it 
is however difficult, as things stand today, to argue that such interpretation 
is in accordance with customary international law. 
4.2.4  With knowledge of the attack 
Government officials with interest in development projects may knowingly 
accept that their activities will almost certainly contribute to gross human 
rights violations through the forcible transfer of population, even though 
they rarely act with that aim. In general, a person is criminally responsible 
for certain conduct only when a mental element with respect to this conduct 
exists. However, in regard to crimes against humanity, apart from the 
required criminal intent for the underlying offences, e.g. forcible transfer of 
population, the perpetrator must also commit the act ‘with knowledge of the 
attack’. Thus, in addition to criminal intent, it must be established that the 
intent is adjoined to the contextual elements, i.e. a widespread or systematic 
attack against a civilian population.184  
Neither the statute of the ICTY nor the ICTR elaborate on the 
nature of intent needed in relation to the contextual elements of the crime 
against humanity.185 However, in jurisprudence from the tribunals there 
seems to be no dispute that the perpetrator must have knowledge that there 
is an attack on the civilian population and, further, that his or her act is a 
                                                
183 Ibid., para. 654.  
184 Murphy, Sean D., (2015), page 73, para 151; Prosecutor v. Blaškić (2000) para 244. 
185 Ibid. 
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part of that attack.186 This approach is also reflected in the ICC’s Elements 
of Crimes, which for each of the proscribed acts requires that ‘the 
perpetrator knew that the conduct was part of or intended the conduct to be 
part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population’.187  
The Elements of Crimes further emphasises that ‘knowledge’ 
should not be interpreted as requiring proof that the perpetrator knew that 
the conduct was part of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian 
population.188 Rather, as confirmed by the ICTY, ‘knowledge’ ‘can be 
implied from the circumstances’.189 Assuming that ‘knowledge’ can be 
implied from circumstantial evidence, it may, consequently, be sufficient 
that a perpetrator is aware of the risk that his or her conduct is part of an 
attack. It is not necessary to prove that the perpetrator has actual knowledge. 
This definition of ‘knowledge’ has been confirmed by ICTY in its later 
jurisprudence.190  
In a few judgments from the international courts, the threshold 
for knowledge, either explicitly or implicitly, has accepted that the 
perpetrator had knowledge of a possible, as distinct from inevitable, 
outcome of his actions combined with a positive mental or emotional 
disposition towards it.191 This suggests that the perpetrator does not need to 
have detailed knowledge of the particularities of an attack, but must simply 
be aware of the facts related to the attack, which increase the gravity of his 
or her conduct.  
                                                
186 The requirement was first formulated in Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (1997), para 656-
657: ‘the perpetrator must know of the broader context in which his act occurs’, and para 
248: ‘the acts of the accused must comprise part of a pattern of widespread of systematic 
crimes directed against a civilian population and that the accused must have known that his 
acts fits in to such pattern’. 
187 ICC, Elements of Crimes (2000), article 7(1)(a); Murphy, Sean D., (2015), page 73, para 
151.  
188 ICC, Elements of Crimes (2000), article 7(2). 
189 See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (1997), para. 657, stating ‘while knowledge is thus 
required, it is examined on an objective level and factually can be implied from the 
circumstances’. 
190 Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al. (2002), para. 102, the Appeals Chamber underlined that ‘the 
accused must have had the intent to commit the underlying offence or offences with which 
he is charged, and that he must have known “that there is an attack on the civilian 
population and that his acts comprise part of that attack, or at least [that he took] the risk 
that his acts were part of the attack’. 
191 See e.g. Prosecutor v. Blaškić (2004), para 42. 
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5 Forcible Transfer in 
Mombasa, Kenya 
In May 2015, government officials forcibly evicted over one hundred people 
from Jomvu, an informal settlement in Mombasa. The forced evictions were 
carried out to make way for a highway expansion project financed by a 
number of international development banks. A bulldozer razed their homes, 
leaving many homeless and destroying their means of a livelihood.  
  In this chapter the findings in chapter 4 are applied to the 
forced evictions carried out in Jomvu in 2015, and it is analysed whether or 
not they constitute a crime against humanity. The following questions are 
addressed: (1) was there, in fact, a ‘deportation or forcible transfer of 
population’, through ‘expulsion or other coercive acts’; (2) were the 
persons subject to such transfer ‘lawfully present’ in the area from which 
they were removed; (3) did the acts in question constitute a ‘widespread or 
systematic attack directed against any civilian population’; and (4) are 
there grounds under international law under which the forcible transfer 
could take place. 
The facts presented in this chapter on how the evictions was 
carried out are based, unless otherwise indicated, on a report made by 
Amnesty International in 2015, named “Driven Out for Development: 
Forced Evictions in Mombasa”192. It is based on research conducted by 
Amnesty International in Mombasa in 2015.193  On the assumption that the 
factual findings of the Amnesty report are accurate, the conclusions reached 
therein are adopted for the purpose of this analysis. 
 
5.1 The Mombasa-Mariakani Road 
Dualling Project 
The development of transport and infrastructure is a key strategy for 
achieving economic growth, wealth creation and poverty eradication in 
Kenya.194 To achieve this strategy, the so-called Vision 2030195 has been 
                                                
192 Amnesty International, Driven out for Development: Forced evictions in Mombasa, 
Kenya, (2015), available at: https://www.amnesty.be/IMG/pdf/afr3224672015english.pdf 
[accessed 21 May 2017]. 
193 Ibid., page 8. 
194 Office of the Prime Minister, Ministry of Planning, National Development and Vision 
2030, Sessional Paper No. 10 of 2012, on Kenya Vision 2030, 2012, page 13. 
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implemented. One of its flagship schemes is the Mombasa-Mariakani Road 
Dualling Project, which is funded mainly by international investors, such as 
the African Development Bank Group, the European Investment Bank and 
the EU - Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund.196  
The stretch of road is approximately 41 kilometres and forms 
part of the 500 km Mombasa-Nairobi highway that also constitutes part of 
the Northern Corridor linking the Kenyan Coast with the neighbouring 
countries of Uganda, Sudan and Rwanda.197 The project essentially involves 
widening part of the current A 109 highway by 60 metres to ensure a 
smooth flow of traffic, which according to the lead engineering consultant 
will improve travel time, result in lower emissions and fuel consumption, 
reduce congestion, and improve the safety, surface drainage and pedestrian 
mobility along the road.198 
However, since commercial and residential properties, as well 
as a number of large factories currently occupy the land parallel to the 
existing highway, its widening will inevitably lead to displacement.199 The 
Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) for the project identified 488 households 
representing 1352 persons that would have to be relocated for the realisation 
of the project.200 In charge of implementing the project, the Environmental 
and Social Impact Assessment Report of October 2014 and the Resettlement 
Action Plan (RAP) of October 2014 is the Kenya National Highways 
Authority (KENHA), an agency of the national government under the 
Ministry of Transport.201 The RAP states that: 
[The project] will be implemented by compensating the individuals affected 
by the proposed road upgrading activities. The compensation and assistance 
allowances will enable the [project affected persons] to relocate and pave 
way for the road construction. In compliance with both the national 
regulations and the AfDB policy and procedures, all [project affected 
persons] will be resettled and compensated before the construction activities 
commence.202  
Thus the following four components must be satisfied before the relocation 
can begin; (1) notification; (2) verification of properties of project affected 
persons and estimation of their type and level of losses; (3) preparation of 
                                                                                                                        
195 Office of the Prime Minister, Ministry of Planning, National Development and Vision 
2030, Sessional Paper No. 10 of 2012, on Kenya Vision 2030, 2012. 
196 Ibid., page 16; see also Amnesty International (2015), page 16. 
197 Ibid., see also Environmental and Social Impact Assessment Report by AECOM RoA 
(Pty) Ltd and CAPE Consult for Kenya National Highways Authority, October 2014, 
Executive summary. 
198 Environmental and Social Impact Assessment Report (2014), page 21. 
199 Environmental and Social Impact Assessment Report (2014), Executive summary. 
200  Resettlement Action Plan (2014), page 10. 
201 Environmental and Social Impact Assessment Report (2014), Executive summary. 
202 Resettlement Action Plan (2014) page XXVI.  
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entitlement persons for Land Acquisition, and; (4) relocation and 
resettlement of the project affected people.203 According to the RAP, the 
time scale for the resettlement process was estimated to take fourteen 
months taking into account potential conflicts and grievance resolutions that 
may take place throughout the process.204 
 
5.2 Background 
Mombasa County, where the project is partly carried out, is one of the most 
densely populated counties in Kenya. Unresolved historical land ownership 
disputes have led to large areas of land being occupied by people who do 
not have a legally recognised right to the land.205 One informal settlement 
along the A109 highway between Mombasa and Mariakani, affected by the 
RAP, is Jomvu.206 The section of Jomvu that is close to the highway is 
located on land that has been set aside for the construction of roads.207 
Known as the road reserve, such land is considered public land and is held 
by the national government, thus few of the structure owners have security 
of tenure.208 The section of Jomvu along the highway comprises small 
residential and commercial properties, as well as a few small factories.209 
On 19 and 20 January 2015, KENHA issued eviction notices 
to residents and business owners in Jomvu, stating that they had infringed 
on the national road reserve.210 The notices gave the project-affected 
persons 30 days to leave the area and stated that failure to do so would lead 
to KENHA taking steps to remove the structures. According to Amnesty 
International’s report, the notice did not state the purpose of the eviction, 
nor whether affected people would be entitled to any legal redress, 
compensation or assistance towards resettlement.211 Instead, by citing the 
Kenya Traffic Act, making it an offence to encroach onto a road or areas 
reserved for the road, the Authority informed the affected people that if they 
remained in the area, this would constitute an offence, which upon 
                                                
203 Ibid., page XXI.  
204 Ibid.,. page XXII para 6. 
205 Amnesty International (2015), page 6.  
206 RAP (2014), page XII. 
207 Ibid., page 18; see also Services for conduct of an eviction audit and preparation of a 
corrective action plan for the Mombasa-Mariakani Road Project, Final audit report, March 
2016, para 1.4. 
208 The Kenya Roads Act 2007, section 49.1; Final Eviction Audit Report (2016), para 
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209 RAP (2014), page 9; Final Eviction Audit Report (2016), para 4.1. 
210 Environmental and Social Impact Assessment Report (2014), page 3; Amnesty 
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conviction could lead to imprisonment or a fine.212 Around the same time, 
unidentified people came to the settlement and painted large yellow crosses 
on the homes and shops of those to be evicted.213 The 30 days passed by 
without any communication on the impending evictions or compensation.  
On 17 May 2015, around midnight, an unknown demolition 
group with a bulldozer entered the area of Jomvu accompanied by armed 
police. According to Amnesty International researchers ‘the bulldozer, 
accompanied by armed police, systematically demolished shops and homes 
that bore yellow crosses and were adjacent to the highway’.214 Neither the 
demolition workers, nor the police, announced who had ordered the 
evictions. The demolition stopped at around 4 am. At this time more than 30 
structures had been demolished, leaving in excess of a hundred people 
homeless.215 Before leaving, the demolition workers told the people whose 
houses were not yet demolished, to demolish their homes themselves. They 
also announced that they would return the following night to complete the 
task of demolishing all marked structures. As a result, many people started 
demolishing their own homes as they felt that they had no choice and this 
way they could salvage some of the more expensive construction material 
for reuse. However, the bulldozer did not return.216  
The following month, neither the government, nor any other 
agency, visited the area to explain what was happening or address the needs 
of those who had been forcibly evicted. It was not until August 2015, three 
months after the evictions, that KENHA organised a public meeting. Those 
attending were informed that the area needed for the project would be 
cleared of all structures by June 2016.217 At the time of writing, people have 
not seen any compensation nor have they been offered any social support to 
resettle elsewhere. Thus, many of the affected people remain without a place 
to live.218 
 
5.3 Responisble actors 
The Government of Kenya (the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure), 
through the KENHA, is the main responsible actor for the Mombasa-
                                                
212 Ibid. 
213 Ibid.; see also Final Eviction Audit Report (2016), para 1.4. 
214 Amnesty International (2015), page 22. 
215 Ibid., page 5. 
216 Ibid., page 23; Final Eviction Audit Report (2016), para 1.4.  
217 Ibid., page 32. 
218 Amnesty International (2015), page 55; contradictory numbers is found in the Final 
Eviction Audit Report (2016), para 4.2.3. 
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Mariakani Road Dualling Project.219 KENHA is an explicit regulatory 
function. The organisation of the project involves a large range of actors. 
The various stakeholders of the highway project include, inter alia, the 
national government, municipal authorities, international and national 
shareholders such as the African Development Bank Group, the European 
Investment Bank and the EU - Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund and 
contracted road construction and demolition workers.  
It is noteworthy to mention that the state carries the primary 
responsibility for respecting, protecting and promoting the human rights of 
the people of Jomvu.220 The development-induced displacement, through 
forced evictions and demolition of structures, was carried out by KENHA, 
with assistance of the County Commissioner’s office and OCPD 
Changamwe Police Station.221  
 Due to the limited information available on the details 
concerning the displacement, it is currently not possible to identify a public 
official who individual criminal responsibility can be imposed on. Thus, the 
present analysis will not deal with the criminal responsibility of specific or 
identifiable individuals, but rather whether the kind of conduct carried out 
within the Mombasa-Mariakani Road Dualling Project can amount to a 
crime against humanity.  
 
5.4 Forcible transfer of population 
On the question of whether there was in fact a forcible transfer of population 
as defined in customary international law, it is clear from the facts given in 
the background that the requirements, namely, that there be transfer of one 
or more persons and that such transfer be coerced or forced, have been met. 
Because the transfers were executed without the consent of the individuals 
concerned and a range of coercive measures were employed to force people 
to flee their homes, including destruction of their homes, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the acts fall within the range of practices proscribed as 
forcible transfer in customary law.222 To constitute forcible transfer of 
population under the scope of a crime against humanity, it must further be 
established that the people forcibly transferred were lawfully in the area and 
that the impugned acts do not fall under any exception in international law 
allowing for a forcible transfer of population.  
 
                                                
219 RAP, Executive summary. 
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5.4.1 Legality of the evictions 
As concluded in Chapter 4.1.2, it is reasonable to assume that ‘lawfully 
present’ relates to domestic law, provided that the law is in compliance with 
the state’s international obligations. Thus, to answer the question of whether 
or not the persons subject to forcible transfer in the Mombasa-Mariakani 
Road Dualling Project were ‘lawfully present’ in the area from which they 
were removed, two sub-questions must be addressed, specifically; (1) were 
the persons subject to the forcible transfer ‘lawfully present’ under Kenyan 
domestic law and, (2) assuming that the persons subject to the forcible 
transfer were not lawfully present under Kenyan domestic law, is that law 
compatible with international law? 
 
Kenyan Domestic Law 
Kenya’s Constitution of 2010 recognises a number of economic, social and 
cultural rights including the right to housing. Article 43 (1b) of the 
Constitution states that ‘[e]very person has a right to accessible and 
adequate housing and to reasonable standards of sanitation’.223 The right to 
housing is limited by Article 40(3) of the Constitution which gives the state 
the right to compulsorily acquire land and deprive any individual of his right 
to land for public purpose.224 
Kenya’s Land Act of 2012 covers compulsory acquisition of 
interests in land as well as eviction due to unlawful occupation of land.225 
According to the act, compulsory acquisition of land is only lawful when it 
can be demonstrated that the land is required for fulfilling a public 
purpose.226 To be lawful the procedure must further allow notice, 
compensation and judicial intervention.227 In cases of compulsory 
acquisition, the act provides for just compensation, however only for those 
whose interests in the land have been established.228 The protection that the 
Act affords through the process of compulsory acquisition therefore does 
not apply to people and informal settlements occupying public land. 
                                                
223 Kenya: Constitution of 2010, article 43 (1b). 
224 Kenya: Constitution of 2010, article 40 (3). 
225 Kenya: Act No. 6 of 2012, Land Act, 2012, part VIII and XI. 
226 Ibid., Part VIII, para 110 (1), stating ‘land may be acquired compulsorily under this Part 
if the Commission certifies, in writing, that the land is required for public purposes or in 
the public interest as related to and necessary for fulfilment of the stated public purpose’. 
227 Ibid., part VIII. 
228 Ibid., part VIII, para 109. 
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Unlawful occupation of public land, according to the Act, 
means ‘any person who, without, express or implied, lawful authority or 
without any right or license, under customary or statutory land law so to do 
occupies, or erects any building on any public land’.229 Furthermore, 
according to the Kenyan Traffic Act of 2013, it is an offence to encroach 
onto a road or areas reserved for the road including by erecting a building, 
constructing a fence or planting a tree. The Act grants the KENHA authority 
to remove such encroachments from the road or areas reserved for the 
road.230  
The Prevention, Protection and Assistance to Internally 
Displaced Persons and Affected Communities Act of 2012 gives effect to 
the Great Lakes Protocol on the Protection and Assistance to Internally 
Displaced Persons and the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement. It requires the government to provide full information to 
internally displaced persons and ensure their effective participation in the 
planning, management of the displacement and in defining suitable durable 
solutions.231 According to the Act, an ‘internally displaced person’ means: 
[A] person or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or 
to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result 
of or in order to avoid the effects of […], large scale development projects, 
[…], and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State 
border.232  
The Act sets principles for suitable solutions for internally displaced people 
including enjoyment of an adequate standard of living and access to 
mechanisms that restore housing, land or property. Furthermore, the Act 
provides that displacement should be carried out in a manner that respects 
human rights, especially of those who may be vulnerable to discrimination 
and marginalization.233 
Section 21 and 22 of the Act focus on displacement resulting 
from large-scale development projects. They state that displacement due to 
large-scale development projects may be permissible in exceptional cases 
where there are no feasible alternatives to displacement.234 However, in 
cases where displacement is permissible, certain safeguards against forced 
evictions must be fulfilled, these include, inter alia, to hold public hearings 
on the planned displacement, to demonstrate that all feasible alternatives to 
displacement have been duly considered and to provide access to effective 
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remedies.235 
Since, Jomvu is an informal settlement, the majority of people 
living there would qualify as unlawful occupants, and are therefore not 
granted legal protection, such as notice, compensation or judicial 
intervention under the Kenyan Land Act. During a public sensitisation 
meeting, KENHA explained that there would be land acquisition, 
compensation and the disbursement of a disturbance allowance. For people 
occupying the land without a title, KENHA representatives said that they 
would only recognise formal documentation, thus excluding the majority of 
the victims.236  
However, as established in the previous chapter, ‘lawfully’, 
should not be taken to refer solely to domestic law, such interpretation 
would accord the government a carte blanche to behave as it likes, provided 
that it did so in accordance with pre-established domestic rules. Thus, 
‘lawfully present’ should be taken to refer to Kenyan domestic law to the 
extent that it is consistent with Kenya’s international obligations. 
 
Kenya’s International Obligations 
The Government of Kenya is obligated under a range of regional and 
international human rights treaties, to respect, protect and fulfil human 
rights, in particular the right to adequate housing.237 The CESCR, 
established to oversee implementation of the ICESCR to which Kenya is 
party, has emphasized that even when an eviction is considered to be 
justified, ‘it should be carried out in strict compliance with the relevant 
provisions of international human rights law and in accordance with 
general principles of reasonableness and proportionality’.238 From the 
description of evictions carried out in Jomvu, it is clear that the KENHA 
showed obvious disregard for people’s safety, human rights and dignity. 
Moreover, they neglected to put in place the necessary human rights 
safeguards, such as meditation, procedural safeguards and compensation, 
against forced evictions before carrying out the demolitions in Jomvu.239  
The CESCR has further emphasised that evictions are only to 
be considered justified when they are carried out in strict compliance with 
principles of international law and due process requirements.240 Among the 
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safeguards listed by the Committee, lawful evictions may not take place in 
particularly bad weather or at night.241 Contrary to this safeguard, the Jomvu 
evictions were carried out from midnight to early morning, at a time when 
people were asleep. The timing of the forced eviction not only caught 
people by surprise, which made them unable to react, but also instilled fear 
and panic among community members. 
The CESCR, has also clarified that a government should 
respect the right to adequate housing including by refraining from the use of 
forced evictions, protecting people from interference with their rights by 
third parties such as landlords, and adopting appropriate legislative, 
administrative, budgetary, judicial, promotional and other measures to fully 
realize the right to adequate housing.242 Thus, while it is clear that many of 
the people in Jomvu were not lawfully present in the area under domestic 
land law, excluding these people from legal protection is clearly in conflict 
with international law. 
Although KENHA officials had issued eviction notices to 
Jomvu residents in January 2015 and painted large yellow crosses marking 
their homes and businesses for demolition. The authority had not taken any 
steps to consult with the affected people, to inform them about the timeline 
for the eviction, its process or made any information on compensation or 
resettlement measures available to them.  
In regard to lawfully present it may also be noted that the ICC, 
when investigating forcible transfer in Kenya as the result of post-election 
violence following the 2007-2008 national election, found nothing to 
indicate that the targeted civilians were not lawfully present in the areas 
from which they were evicted, or that such evictions were justified under 
international law.243 The destruction of property, forced evictions and 
displacement of people were, however, likewise carried out in some of 
Nairobi’s informal settlements.244  
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5.5 Satisfaction of the contextual 
elements  
5.5.1 The forced evictions is part of a 
widespread or systematic attack 
This section aims to determine whether the forced evictions were committed 
as part of a widespread or systematic attack. To begin with, it must be noted 
that an act can, as mentioned in Chapter 4.2.1., be part of a widespread or 
systematic attack and need not be part of both.245 The term ‘widespread’ 
may be understood as requiring a minimum scale of crimes, while the term 
‘systematic’ refers to the methods and policy of the crimes. 
Seen in a larger perspective the forced evictions as a result of 
development projects can constitute part of a ‘widespread’ attack. In order 
to prove a pattern, it has to be established that the same things happened in 
the same manner on different occasions with sufficient frequency.246 Similar 
acts have been taken place in numerous places around Kenya, directed 
against a multiplicity of victims. E.g. in October and November 2011, state 
authorities carried out mass forced evictions in five informal and formal 
settlements in Nairobi. The settlements were located close to the Jomo 
Kenyatta International Airport. Thousands of people were affected by the 
evictions, some carried out at night despite an existing temporary injunction 
from the High Court preventing demolition and evictions taking place 
pending a hearing regarding ownership of the land on which the settlement 
was located. Government officials maintained that evictions close to the 
airports were necessary because the settlements were around restricted 
airport areas.247 Another example is from January 2014, when the Kenya 
Forest Service forcibly evicted hundreds of people belonging to Sengwer, an 
Indigenous People living in Embobut Forest in the Cherengany Hills area of 
Kenya.248 
In April 2016 the CESCR, in its concluding observations on 
the combined second to fifth periodic reports of Kenya, emphasised that: 
[C]ommunities and persons living in informal settlements are under 
constant threat of eviction due to the lack of legal security of tenure and that 
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forced evictions continue without prior notice and provision of adequate 
alternative housing or compensation.249  
The Committee further stated that Kenya had not enacted a legislative 
framework to recognise and protect communities’ right to land and that 
explicitly prohibits forced evictions and define the circumstances and 
safeguards subject to which evictions may be carried out.250  
Thus, seen in this context, considering the previous history of 
forced evictions in Kenya and the criticism from the CESCR, the forced 
evictions carried out in Jomvu may be seen as part of a widespread attack on 
the civilian population. As far as the multiple commissions of acts are 
concerned, there is no requirement that more than one type of the 
enumerated acts of crimes against humanity be committed.251 This 
requirement either refers to more than one generic act, even though this is 
not required, or more than a few isolated incidents. Thus, in the case at 
hand, the numerous incidents of forcible transfer of population may suffice 
to establish this prerequisite. It is not obligatory to prove that there was a 
separate attack against the same civilians in the context where the forcible 
transfer took place.  
Since there is not sufficient jurisprudence on what numbers of 
victims are needed for an attack to count as widespread it is difficult to 
make an assessment whether the forced evictions in Kenya are to be seen as 
widespread.252 However, the forced evictions carried out as a part of the 
Mombasa-Mariakani Road Dualling Project may still amount to a crime 
against humanity on the basis of being systematic. The forced evictions in 
Jomvu can be characterised as systematic as they were organised and 
conducted on the basis of a government policy for the Mombasa-Mariakani 
Road Dualling Project and involved public resources, such as police 
assistance to carry out the demolitions.253  Although it is correct that 
isolated, random acts should not be included in the definition of crimes 
against humanity, an isolated act can constitute a crime against humanity if 
it is the product of a political system. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude 
that there has been a widespread or systematic attack as defined in 
customary international law. 
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5.5.2 The affected group is a civilian population 
To conclude whether or not a crime against humanity has taken place, it 
must secondly be determined whether there was an attack against a civilian 
population. The term ‘population’ does not require that crimes against 
humanity be directed against the entire population of a geographic territory 
or area.254 Furthermore, the victims of the act need not necessarily share 
geographic or other defining features with the civilian population that forms 
the primary target of the underlying attack, but such characteristics may be 
used to demonstrate that the enumerated acts form part of the attack.255 
Thus, it need not be proven that the whole population of Jomvu was forcibly 
transferred. To establish the existence of an ‘attack directed against a 
civilian population’ it is sufficient to show that enough individuals were 
targeted that it is clear that the attack was not limited to a randomly selected 
number of individuals.256  
 As to the term ‘directed against’, this requires that the civilian 
population is the intended target of the attack and not only an incidental 
victim of the attack. Directed against places emphasises on the intention of 
the attack. At a first glance, such interpretation of ’directed against’ seem to 
exclude development-induced displacement in general, and in this particular 
case it could be argued that the intention of the forced evictions in Jomvu is 
to clear land to enable an expansion of the highway, which in turn would 
ensure smooth flow of traffic, improved travel times, and result in less 
negative environmental impacts, as emissions and fuel consumption would 
be reduced.  
However, the overall intention of the Mombasa-Mariakani 
Road Dualling Project is not to be confused with the intention of the forced 
evictions carried out in Kenya.257 The attack is the act of forced evictions, 
not the Mombasa-Mariakani Road Dualling Project as such. Therefor when 
assessing whether the attack was directed against the civilian population, 
instead of focusing on the aim of the road project, the means and methods 
used in relation to the forcible transfer of population should be assessed. As 
the ICC concluded in its Bemba case258, it is sufficient evidence that an 
attack is directed against the civilian population if it is evident that people 
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where being attacked inside their houses or on their courtyards.259  
The lack of warnings and the decision to carry out the 
demolitions at night time, when it is fair to assume that the people of Jomvu 
were asleep inside their homes, therefor not only represents an obvious 
disregard for the people’s safety but also indicates that the attack was 
directed against a civilian population.  
 
5.5.3 The attack is pursuant to a policy 
The requirement of a ‘policy’ constitutes a basis for ensuring that random or 
isolated acts are excluded from the scope of crimes against humanity. 
However, as indicated in the Chapter 4.2.3, it is uncertain whether or not 
international customary law indeed requires a link to a policy for an attack 
to constitute a crime against humanity. Assuming it does, it would be 
sufficient to show that the policy provides certain guidance regarding the 
prospective victims in order to coordinate the activities of the perpetrators. 
As implied in previous chapter, the policy behind an attack may be one of 
mere deliberate inaction or toleration.  
 Although the Resettlement Action Plan provides for both 
consultation and compensation, a large proportion of the victims in Jomvu - 
those counting as unlawful occupants - are left without protection. This 
exclusion can be argued to actively pave the way for violations in regards to 
their human rights, in particular their right to housing.  
Additionally, the government officials apathy in regard to 
enact a legislative framework to recognise and protect communities’ right to 
land and to explicitly prohibit forced evictions becomes particularly 
disturbing when the government itself deliberately and arbitrarily displaced 
the very people it is then called upon to protect. In its concluding 
observations on Kenya from 2016, the ICESCR recommended that Kenya 
‘take concrete steps to guarantee security of tenure for all, including 
residents of informal settlements’.260 The Committee further recommended 
that Kenya, with reference to its General Comment No. 7 on the right to 
adequate housing and the guidelines on development-based evictions and 
displacement: 
[I]mplement judicial orders that provide remedies to victims of forced 
evictions as a matter of priority and adopt a moratorium on mass evictions 
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at the national level until adequate legal and procedural safeguards are in 
place.261  
The execution of the evictions was announced by governmental officials 
and carried out with assistance from the police. In addition, the government 
officials’ inaction to take legislative measures, possibly due to political or 
economic gain, to prevent this type of forced eviction amounts to a policy of 
toleration. 
 
5.5.4 The perpetrator had knowledge of the 
attack 
The present analysis does not, as described under Chapter 5.3, deal with the 
criminal responsibility of specific or identifiable individuals. Rather it is 
concerned with whether or not the kind of conduct carried out in the 
Mombasa-Mariakani Road Dualling Project can amount to a crime against 
humanity. Assuming public officials involved had knowledge of the attack, 
this would open up for a conviction under international criminal law. 
However, in this particular case, and with the limited information available, 
the knowledge requirement will be discussed mainly in general terms. 
 The knowledge element of crimes against humanity requires 
that the accused (a) knows of the existence of the attack; and (b) knows that 
his or her individual act forms part of the attack. This knowledge may be 
general, that is, without possessing detailed information of its specific 
characteristics and circumstances.262 In this case, such circumstances could 
be a pattern of illegal and violent evictions carried out during night time in, 
or the criticism on the lack of protection for victims of forced evictions 
repeatedly raised by CESCR. Consequently, it is enough that the perpetrator 
was aware that his or her conduct was part of a widespread or systematic 
attack and was pursuant to some kind of policy. 
 It is established that there must be a nexus between the acts of 
the accused and the attack. However, this does not mean that the criminal 
conduct needs to be committed in the midst of the attack, but it could be 
committed before or after the attack or even geographically far away from 
the attack, as long as it has a connection to it.263 Likewise, it may be suffice 
to prove that the accused knew that he was in a position to stop the attack, 
but deliberately and knowingly decided not to stop it, thus broadening the 
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attack. The relationship between the conduct and the attack will be 
dependent on the circumstances surrounding the act, such as whether there 
are similarities between the acts of the accused and the attack.264 The 
perpetrator’s ability to impact the attack against the civilian population, 
including the ability to deter or stop it, should also be taken into 
consideration. 
Consequently, in the present context, this would, most likely, 
be a public official. However the criminal responsibility of each individual 
who may eventually be indicted in this particular case must be determined 
on the basis of evidence which is currently not available and beyond the 
scope of this analysis.  
 
5.6 The forced evictions in Jomvu 
constitute a crime against humanity 
In May 2015, KENHA officials forcibly evicted over one hundred people 
from Jomvu informal settlement in Mombasa. The forced evictions were 
carried out to make way for a highway expansion project financed by a 
number of international development banks. Armed police drove the 
population of Jomvu from their beds in the middle of the night, without 
warning. A bulldozer razed their homes, leaving many homeless and 
destroying their means of livelihood. People were not consulted before the 
evictions nor compensated afterwards. They do not know where, or even if, 
they will be relocated.  
The development of transport and infrastructure is a key 
strategy for achieving economic growth, wealth creation and poverty 
eradication in Kenya. To achieve these goals the relocation of people may 
be necessary. The long-term positive outcome for the area may outweigh the 
negative consequences for the affected people. However, the capacity to 
show that displacement is necessary in a certain case does not amount to a 
free card to carry out the displacement without concern for any human rights 
safeguards. Forced evictions may violate international human rights law. It 
is obvious from Amnesty International’s report that Government officials 
have not adhered to essential safeguards, set down in international human 
rights law and standards, to prevent the evictions from being unlawful. 
Thus, it is possible that the forcible transfer of population in Jomvu 
constitutes a crime against humanity even though positive outcomes can be 
demonstrated.  
To determine whether the forced evictions in Jomvu 
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constitutes a crime against humanity through forcible transfer of population 
in customary international law, a number of questions must be answered in 
the affirmative. The questions which have been addressed are (1) was there, 
in fact, a deportation or forcible transfer of population in Jomvu, through 
expulsion or other coercive acts; (2) were the persons subject to the 
deportation or forcible transfer legally present in the area from which they 
were removed; (3) did the acts in question constitute a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against any civilian population, and; (4) were 
there grounds under international law under which the deportation or 
forcible transfer could lawfully take place. 
The first part of the assessment examined whether there was in 
fact a forcible transfer of population as defined in customary international 
law. It was concluded herein that the requirements, namely, that there be the 
transfer of one or more persons and that such transfer be coerced or forced, 
have been met. As the transfers were executed without the consent of the 
individuals concerned and a range of coercive measures were employed, it is 
reasonable to conclude that there was, in fact, a forcible transfer of 
population of the population of Jomvu.  
Part two addressed the legality of the evictions; in particular 
whether those subject to the forcible transfer in Jomvu were legally present 
in the area. Legally present requires that the domestic laws defining the 
legality or illegality of the people of Jomvu’s presence comply with Kenya’s 
international obligations. Even if it is accepted that most of those evicted 
were not lawfully present under Kenyan domestic law, it is important to 
note that the authorities did not seek to distinguish between people in the 
area being legally present or not when carrying out the evictions. It may be 
argued that the authorities should not be permitted to rely on the lack of 
distinction for the purposes of asserting the legality of the evictions and 
demolitions. The prerequisite for crimes against humanity does not require 
that all of the victims of forcible transfer of population be lawfully present.  
Examining the legality of the evictions, international law 
exceptions allowing for forcible transfers was also addressed. It was 
concluded herein that it may be argued that there is a strong public interest 
for developing infrastructure in the area. The road will connect Mombasa to 
several of Kenya’s neighbouring countries, making the port increasingly 
important in the area. This may, by extension, lead to economic growth, 
wealth creation and poverty eradication. However, arguing for an overriding 
public interest of development may not be enough to constitute a ground 
permitted under international law. Even though there may be a strong public 
interest of development in the area, this does not mean that the development 
projects be carried out in a manner which is inconsistent with other rights, 
such as the right to adequate housing, the right to security of the person, the 
right to non-interference with privacy, family and home and the right to 
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effective remedies. 
 Thus, the requirements under international law allowing for 
the limitation of the people of Jomvu’s rights have not been met. Although a 
strong public interest can be argued to outweigh the negative consequences 
of displacement for the affected individuals in certain cases, forced transfer 
of population through unlawful evictions does not adequately safeguard the 
rights of the affected people. In Jomvu, the evicted individuals did not have 
adequate access to information regarding the evictions nor had any 
compensation or resettlement measures been offered to them. Furthermore, 
as emphasised by the CESCR, as the evictions in Jomvu were carried out at 
night time they are illegal regardless of overriding public interests.  
The third part examined whether or not the forcible transfer of 
population was committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population. It was concluded herein that the 
requirements of customary international law have been fulfilled. Taking into 
consideration the means and manner in which the forced evictions were 
conducted, it is reasonable to conclude that it constituted part of an attack.  
It is clear that the conflict of land in Kenya is the result of 
systematic deficiencies in the land management framework. Kenya has 
repeatedly been criticised by CESCR and numerous international and 
domestic NGOs for disregarding its international human rights obligations 
in regard to housing. Furthermore, it has been established that similar acts 
were carried out in similar manner on different occasions around Kenya. 
Thus, related acts have been taken place in numerous places, creating an 
attack directed against the civilian population. In addition, the government 
officials which so far have been incapable of addressing the issues 
surrounding informal settlements and land disputes, possible due to political 
or economic gain, has relied increasingly on pointing towards development 
project and an overriding public interest to remove people from the areas. 
The forced evictions in Jomvu add to this pattern which has resulted in 
large-scale displacement of Kenya’s most vulnerable populations.  
 Thus, considering that the forced evictions carried out in 
Jomvu arguably satisfies the elements of the crime of forcible transfer, it 
may be concluded that there is a supportive basis to affirm that there are 
circumstances under which development-induced displacement constitutes a 
crime against humanity through forcible transfer of population. 
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6 Conclusion 
Referring back, the purpose of this thesis is to explore how crimes against 
humanity in general and the crime of forcible transfer of population in 
particular, covers the most heinous situations of development-induced 
displacement. Indeed, the crime against humanity belongs to an area of 
international law where doubts of its scope still remain. This thesis’ agreed 
starting premise is however that forcibly removing individuals from their 
homes is a crime against humanity. 
 The research question is concerned with what is required for 
development-induced displacement to constitute a crime against humanity 
through forcible transfer of a population. To satisfactorily answer the 
question three subsequent questions were relied upon. Before concluding, 
these will shortly be addressed. 
 
Firstly, what is development-induced displacement? 
 
Development-induced displacement consists of the forcible movement of 
persons from their homes due to development projects, such as the building 
of dams, roads, and other infrastructure, as well as the exploitation of 
natural resources in mining and oil projects, to name just a few examples. 
Similarly to those displaced due to armed conflict or human rights 
violations, individuals displaced by development suffer from the loss of 
their homes and livelihoods, the dispersal of their communities, and the 
physical and psychological damage associated with other types of 
involuntary displacement.  
However, in comparison to other forms of forced 
displacement, development-induced displacement differs in one significant 
way. Whereas persecution, conflict or natural disasters are never considered 
to be a ‘good cause’ in and of themselves, development, including the 
construction or establishment of dams, ports, mines, railways, highways, 
airports, irrigation canals, urban infrastructure, forestry and agricultural 
projects, for reasons of urban or rural economic development is by many 
considered to be valid justification for displacement. 
 Development-induced displacement prevails especially in the 
global south in countries that are engaged in large-scale projects to increase 
and improve their economies and domestic infrastructures. The most 
obvious are the Asian countries, which account for the greatest amount of 
development-induced displacement in the world. However, the occurrence 
of development-induced displacement is increasingly an issue in Africa and 
Latin America.  
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Secondly, what international human rights standards must be fulfilled for 
development-induced displacement to be justified? 
 
A large number of human rights guarantee legal protection against 
displacement to a lesser or greater degree. In particular, the right to adequate 
housing offer significant legal protection and, moreover, can be said to 
imply a right not to be arbitrarily displaced. In addition, several guidelines 
on development-induced displacement spell out the circumstances under 
which displacement may be carried out in a lawful way.  
The CESCR has indicated, in relation to the right to adequate 
housing and not to be arbitrarily displaced, that there are situations where it 
may be necessary to impose limitations. Such limitations must however be 
in accordance with domestic law, have a substantive and proper 
justification, and be reasonable and proportional. Proper justification is, 
according to the Committee solely for the purpose of promoting the general 
welfare in a democratic society. 
Additional safeguards provided under international human 
rights law state that an eviction must not be carried out before all feasible 
alternatives are explored, adequate compensation must be provided for 
affected people, and where reasonably possible, those affected must be 
provided with adequate alternative housing. Finally, a number of procedural 
guarantees, for example relating to information, consultation and legal 
remedies, must be complied with. In other words, international human rights 
law does not prohibit displacement necessitated by large-scale development 
projects altogether, nor does it however consider such displacements per se 
as sacrifices for a good cause. Instead a distinction is made between 
arbitrary evictions on the one hand, and lawful evictions on the other.  
 
Finally, what elements are required for an act to constitute a crime against 
humanity? 
 
Although efforts have been made to define crimes against humanity, there 
is, to date, no single recognised definition of the crime in customary 
international law. The scope of crime against humanity has evolved over 
time, important interpretations have been made in the statutes and 
jurisprudence of contemporary international criminal tribunals, such as the 
ICTY and ICTR, and not least, in the Rome Statute and the case law of the 
ICC. Thus, the codification and application of the crime contains several 
basic elements that are common across the majority of definitions.  
Two especially debated questions in relation to the definition 
of crime against humanity through forcible transfer of population are, 
firstly, if arbitrary transfer of population from one area to another within the 
same state, and secondly, whether transfer occurring during peacetime, are 
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included in the definition. Seen to the latest development in jurisprudence 
and the adoption of the Rome Statue, it is fair to assume that both questions 
can be answered in the affirmative. 
The definition of the elements of the crime against humanity 
through forcible transfer of population as presented in the Rome Statute 
states ‘for the purpose of this Statute, ‘crime against humanity’ means any 
of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the 
attack: […] (d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population; […]’. 
According to the ILC this is the most widely accepted formulation, although 
there are deviant customary elements. 
Beginning with the prohibited act, forcible transfer of 
population. All population transfers have the common feature of large-scale 
movement of groups of people. However, for an act to be considered 
forcible transfer of population, three cumulative conditions must be 
established, which are (1) forcible character; (2) lawful presence of the 
displaced; and (3) absence of grounds permitted under international law. If 
one of these conditions is absent, the act is not considered a crime of 
forcible transfer of population. The limited scope means that not all large-
scale movements of people constitute a crime. Justifications such as 
voluntariness, national welfare and temporariness are regularly offered. 
However these should be considered carefully as they often conceal a wish 
to disguise the criminal elements of the act.  
For the prohibited act to constitute a crime against humanity, 
four prerequisites must additionally be satisfied, namely that the act is (1) 
part of a widespread or systematic attack, (2) directed against any civilian 
population, (3) pursuant to or in furtherance of a policy and (4) carried out 
with knowledge of the attack. 
 
Returning to the main question for this thesis, under which circumstances 
does development-induced displacement constitute a crime against 
humanity through forcible transfer of populations? 
  
Analysing the relationship between development-induced displacement and 
crimes against humanity reveals an evolving state of affairs. Although, there 
is a conspicuous lack of state practice, there is increasingly international 
recognition that development-induced displacement has many of the same 
effects upon the displaced as other groups who have been forcibly 
displaced. This provides a growing coherent basis for affirmatively 
establishing development-induced displacement as a crime against 
humanity.  
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This can be illustrated by the findings from the analysis in 
Chapter 5 of the implementation of the Mombasa-Mariakani Road Dualling 
Project in Kenya. Large parts of Kenya’s population live in informal 
settlements; in Mombasa it is approximately 65 % of the county’s 
population. The land conflict in Kenya is the result of systematic 
deficiencies in the land management framework. Kenya has repeatedly been 
criticised by CESCR and numerous international and domestic NGOs for 
disregarding its international human rights obligations. 
The people, mostly tenants, living in informal settlements, 
have no positive right under current Kenyan law to reside on the land. 
However, in almost all cases they do not have an alternative option since 
informal settlements represent the only means in the absence of sufficient 
formal housing stock. The Kenyan government so far has been incapable of 
resolving issues relating to informal settlements and land disputes, such as 
security of tenure. Such inaction may correlate to the fact that many 
government officials have profited from the development of the informal 
settlements. What is obvious is that the settlements are a permanent feature 
in the Kenyan community.  
In the last decade, Kenya has experienced rapid development 
within several sectors, such as in energy and infrastructure. This has led to 
increasing economical welfare and a higher standard of living for some. 
However, not all benefit from such development. In the areas where the 
development projects are carried out, the population have seen their homes 
and means of income destroyed. It appears that Kenyan government 
officials, whom so far have been incapable of addressing the issues related 
to informal settlements and land disputes, rely increasingly on pointing the 
finger towards development projects and an overriding public interest to 
remove people from the areas, resulting in large-scale displacement.  
The forced evictions related to the Mombasa-Mariakani Road 
Dualling Project fit this pattern. In May 2015, government officials forcibly 
evicted over one hundred people from Jomvu, an informal settlement in 
Mombasa. The forced evictions were carried out to make way for a highway 
expansion project financed by a number of international development banks. 
Armed police drove the population of Jomvu from their beds in the middle 
of the night, without warning. A bulldozer razed their homes, leaving many 
homeless and destroying their means of a livelihood. The affected people 
were not consulted before the evictions nor were they compensated 
afterwards.  
Considering the circumstances and context surrounding the 
forced evictions in Jomvu, it was concluded that the acts arguably satisfied 
the elements of the crime of forcible transfer. Thus, it may be concluded that 
there is a reasonable basis to believe that a crime against humanity can be 
committed through development-induced displacement. However, the 
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analysis also highlights shortcomings in the assessment in relation to 
deficient definition and scanty jurisprudence on the crime against humanity. 
Two possible weaknesses that progressively became increasingly evident 
were, firstly, the definition of ‘lawfully present’, and secondly, the 
complexity surrounding the element of ‘knowledge” in customary 
international law.  
Beginning with the definition of ‘lawfully present’, 
development-induced displacement mainly occurs in countries with 
underdeveloped land laws, often due to either a long history of internal 
conflicts over land or to corrupt regimes. Thus, similarly to the situation in 
Jomvu, many of the affected people of development-induced displacement 
do not have legal security of tenure, let alone ownership. On the contrary, it 
is common that the affected people live in informal settlements on 
government or communal land or on land subject to land disputes.  
It is unclear in relation to customary international law if the 
term ‘lawfully present’ is merely in regard to domestic law or also includes 
international law. If ‘lawfully present’ is to be interpreted in regard to 
domestic law, a result would be that many of the potential victims of 
development-induced displacement are left vulnerable and defenceless. 
The second shortcoming is the difficulty to tie acts constituting 
part of a widespread or systematic attack to individual perpetrators, as 
development projects are usually complex with a broad spectrum of 
involved actors. Firstly, it must be established who is actually responsible 
for development-induced displacement, considering both government and 
private actors. Although there are indications that non-state actors can 
commit crimes against humanity, at the time of writing, the limited state 
practice and jurisprudence of the international courts make it unlikely. Thus, 
a connection to the actions or inactions of a responsible state must be 
established.  
Secondly, the mental element of crimes against humanity 
requires that the perpetrator (a) knows of the existence of the attack; and (b) 
knows that his or her individual act forms part of the attack. Although a 
person need not be the actual perpetrator of an attack in order to bear 
individual criminal responsibility, the complex structures surrounding 
development projects makes it particular difficult to tie single acts to an 
attack. This is especially the case when the act is one of mere toleration or 
deliberate inaction for the purpose of economical or political gain.  
Indeed, the threshold for crimes against humanity is high. 
However, as indicated above, there are circumstances under which 
development-induced displacement may constitute a crime against humanity 
through forcible transfer of population. This demonstrates that arguing for 
an overriding public interest is by no means a disclaimer against crimes 
against humanity. Rather, even in a case where the public interest of 
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development overrides the affected individuals’ wish to remain in a 
particular area, the act of forcible transfer of population through unlawful 
displacement may still amount to a crime against humanity. 
 
To sum up, the right to housing and to not be forcible displaced are 
fundamental human rights that can be violated in a variety of ways, limited 
only by the human imagination for cruelty. The rights need to be protected 
in all instances, regardless of the motivations of the perpetrators, for the 
effects are the same. Thus, a broad approach is warranted, as well as one 
that focuses upon prevention through the potential liability of the individual, 
which drives the actions of any state.  
Victims of displacement associated with large-scale 
development projects often find themselves in the shadow of those forced to 
flee as a result of conflict or natural disasters. On the contrary, politicians 
and other authorities almost universally support development projects. It is a 
remaining common thought that the benefits of these projects far outweigh 
their negative effects on the livelihoods, homes and health of a few local 
residents. However, given the similar levels of hardship that victims of 
displacement endure, irrespective of the precise cause of the displacement, 
the disparity in attention is not justified. It is about time that victims of 
development-induced displacement receive international recognition. Many 
more initiatives are urgently needed and special efforts must be undertaken 
to ensure that these pleas for justice have an impact beyond academic 
buildings. 
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